

Social Justice in the EU – A Cross-national Comparison



Social Inclusion Monitor Europe (SIM) – Index Report

Daniel Schraad-Tischler and Christian Kroll



Social Justice in the EU

EU Social Justice Index




Social Justice Index




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- II** Equitable education
- III** Labor market inclusion
- IV** Social cohesion and non-discrimination
- V** Health
- VI** Intergenerational justice


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
Annotation: Scores on a scale from 1 to 10. Higher Scores = better performance. For further information see "Methodology" (chapter 3).
Source: Own calculations.




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
Spain



Sweden



United Kingdom



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1. Key findings, in brief

The growing social divide is a topic of much discussion these days. Certainly since the release of French economist Thomas Piketty's recent book, *Capital in the 21st Century*, the topic of this widening gap is on everyone's lips.¹ The comparison of all 28 member states of the European Union (EU) presented here clearly shows that the concept of social justice is realized to very different extents within the borders of the EU. In fact, EU countries vary considerably in their ability to create a truly inclusive society. Whereas the opportunities for every individual to engage in broad-ranging societal participation are best developed in the wealthy northern European countries of Sweden, Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands, many other EU countries show what are at times massive deficiencies in this regard. Social injustice has once again clearly increased in recent years, most obviously in the crisis-battered southern European countries of Greece, Spain and Italy, as well as in Ireland and Hungary. However, a predominantly negative trend is also evident overall: In the majority of EU countries, the reach and scope of social justice has declined in the course of the crisis. Only three countries – Poland, Germany and Luxembourg – have proven able to improve significantly in comparison to the 2008 Social Justice Index.²

The results of the country comparison in the most recent Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) survey (www.sgi-network.org), as well as its underlying country reports, suggest that the rigid austerity policies pursued during the crisis and the structural reforms aimed at economic and budgetary stabilization have had, in most countries, negative effects with regard to social justice. Although there are at least mild signs of hope in the majority of EU countries that the worst economic woes have been overcome, core areas of social injustice remain mostly unaddressed, with no improvement in sight. On the contrary, social security systems have been badly undermined by austerity measures in many countries, as has the ability to invest in critical future-oriented policy areas such as education or research and development. Particularly in southern Europe, youth unemployment has climbed to ever-new record highs. The risk of poverty has also increased further as a result of the crisis. This applies especially to the younger generations, whereas poverty among older people has – from an EU-wide perspective – even been declining over the last years.

The gap between participation opportunities in the still-wealthy countries of northern Europe and in the crisis-struck southern nations has thus significantly increased. This is a highly explosive situation with regard to societal cohesion and social stability within the European Union. Should these social divisions persist for some time, or even worsen further, this will endanger the future viability of the entire European integration project. For this reason, a solution to this problem cannot be found solely within the national context. To be sure, it is primarily member-state governments that are being asked to steer the right course between the competing priorities of essential

¹ Piketty (2014).

² Please note that in the Social Justice Index 2008 and in the Social Justice Index 2011 the following 9 EU countries were not surveyed: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovenia.




budgetary consolidation and equally essential investments in critical future-oriented policy areas. But the Europe-wide pressure of events demands action on the European level. This requires an EU-wide awareness of the problems of currently unsustainable and growing inequalities within the EU. In this context, the future socioeconomic strategy for the EU must be one that is not only concerned with the goal of budgetary consolidation and the resolution of the debt crisis, but also with the aim of *combating social injustice* within the Union. It ought to be a consistent and integrated strategy not only for economic progress but also for social justice. The present study provides a contribution to this effort. It offers a detailed profile of the strengths and weaknesses of all 28 EU member states across six dimensions constitutive of the goals of social justice: poverty prevention, equitable education, access to the labor market, social cohesion and non-discrimination, health and intergenerational justice. The key results of the comparative study can be summarized as follows:

- The Nordic countries of Sweden, Finland and Denmark, as well as the fourth-ranked Netherlands, score particularly well in the areas of poverty prevention, labor market access, social cohesion and non-discrimination. However, even these overall most successful countries within the EU demonstrate weaknesses in some areas; from the perspective of social justice, these should be more strongly addressed. For example, these countries show a distinct lack of labor market access opportunities for migrants. In addition, Sweden and Finland's longtime efforts to combat relatively high rates of youth unemployment have not yet been successful. In Sweden, 23.5 percent of young people lacked employment according to recent figures, along with 19.9 percent in Finland.
- The Czech Republic, which excels in the area of poverty prevention, as well as the three continental European welfare states of Austria, Germany and Luxembourg follow directly behind the top group. Germany's social-justice improvements relative to the 2008 Social Justice Index are most striking. This has primarily been due to the country's very robust labor market development during the crisis, which also had positive effects in the area of poverty prevention, for example. However, the strong employment statistics and very low rate of youth unemployment in cross-EU comparison should not obscure other justice deficits within the German labor market. In recent years, the emergence of a dual labor market has been increasingly evident, with poor vertical permeability from "atypical" employment relationships (enlarged low-wage sector, temporary employment) to "normal working conditions". This is today a key problem, demanding further reform efforts. In addition, Germany and Austria show similar problems in the area of education. The influence of social background on students' educational successes remains much too high in both countries.
- Apart from first-ranked Czech Republic, two further post-communist welfare states, Slovenia (9th) and Estonia (10th), performed at an above-average level in the overall index, even ranking above the three "old" EU member states of Belgium (11th), France (12th) and the United Kingdom (13th). While Estonia falls among the top-ranked EU states particularly in the areas of education access and intergenerational justice, Slovenia shows medium to good results in the areas

of education, intergenerational justice as well as poverty prevention, in this latter respect leaving countries such as the United Kingdom behind. The United Kingdom is ranked only 15th in this area, and – like France – also shows a below-average performance on the issue of just educational opportunities.

- Poland is another post-communist country that has been able to make significant improvements relative to the 2008 Social Justice Index, making a leap into the middle ranks. This was largely driven by its success in the reduction of poverty and social exclusion. However, the policies of the last two

Figure 1a: EU Social Justice Index (weighted)



Source: Own calculations (Data used for constructing the index refer to the periods a: 2005-2008; b: 2008-2010; c: 2011-2013).


Bertelsmann Stiftung



Tusk governments have also led to notable progress in all other areas of the Social Justice Index.

- The bottom third of the social justice rankings, with the exception of Slovakia (17th place), Ireland (18th) and Latvia (23rd), is taken up exclusively by EU member states from southern and south-eastern Europe. These countries show massive shortcomings in most areas of the Social Justice Index, in some cases worsening dramatically in recent years. Greece is at the bottom of the ranking with a youth unemployment rate of nearly 60 percent, a rapid increase in the risk of poverty

Figure 1b: EU Social Justice Index (unweighted)



Source: Own calculations (Data used for constructing the index refer to the periods a: 2005-2008; b: 2008-2010; c: 2011-2013).

BertelsmannStiftung

particularly among children and youth, a health care system badly undermined by austerity measures, discrimination against minorities as a result of strengthened radical political forces, and an enormous mountain of debt that represents a mortgage on the future of coming generations. The resulting diminution of prospects for broad swathes of society represents a significant danger to the country's political and social stability. These developments illustrate that the cuts induced by the crisis are not administered in a balanced way throughout the population.

In looking at the overall results across the Social Justice Index's six dimensions, a very mixed picture emerges with regard to individual EU member states' strengths and weaknesses.

Poverty prevention: About 25.4 percent of the people within the EU are at risk of poverty or social exclusion (2012, 2013) – a figure about 1.7 percentage points higher than that in 2009. The associated EU-wide rate for children and youth has risen as high as 28 percent. The EU remains far indeed from its self-declared goals in the areas of preventing poverty and social exclusion. The discrepancy between a poor south and southeast Europe on the one hand, and an affluent north on the other, is enormous. This unjust state of affairs must become a genuine European issue and take a much more prominent place on the political agenda. While non-monetary poverty – measured on the basis of the extent of serious material deprivation – does not represent a significant societal challenge in the Scandinavian countries, nearly 29 percent of Romanians and 46 percent of Bulgarians are affected by so-called material deprivation. Again, these figures are higher for children and youth. A rapid increase in poverty within this at-risk group was also evident in recent years, particularly in the crisis-struck countries. For those affected by severe material deprivation, the basic conditions enabling social participation and a self-determined life simply do not exist.

Equitable education: The question of whether a society can be deemed socially just depends significantly – in addition to the issue of poverty prevention – on the distribution and organization of educational opportunities. Sweden, Denmark, Lithuania, Estonia, Croatia and Finland are the top-ranking EU countries in this dimension. The influence of a student's social background on his or her educational performance is in this regard least evident in Finland and Estonia. At the same time, these two countries attained the best results in the last PISA survey of learning achievement levels. This demonstrates that a high degree of social justice and a well-performing school and training system need not be incompatible goals. Notable in this context is the fact that the Finnish government, despite an already high degree of justice and quality, has again in its current 2011–2016 government education-policy program placed special focus on the prevention of poverty, inequality and exclusion.

Labor market access: Overall, labor market access opportunities have deteriorated in the broad majority of EU member states over the course of the crisis. In the last several years, the EU has come no closer to the goal declared as a part of the Europe 2020 strategy, which aims to reach an employment rate of 75 percent. Indeed, this rate has even slightly declined from 66 percent in 2008 to 63.5 percent in 2013. In the overall comparison, Austria, Denmark and Germany, followed by the



Nordic countries Finland and Sweden, offer the best labor market access opportunities, although the Scandinavian countries also clearly felt the effects of the crisis within their domestic labor markets. Denmark in particular, which at the beginning of the decade served as a model for labor market reform debates in other countries thanks to its flexicurity model, has since 2008 been forced to accept a significant increase in unemployment, from 3.5 percent to a recent 7.2 percent. Germany, which was able to buck the EU trend and show strong improvements, is instead increasingly being considered by other EU member states as a model for labor market policy reforms. This is also due to Germany's dual system of vocational training. The EU-wide problems with justice within the labor market are above all evident in the unequal distribution of access opportunities for various at-risk groups within society. Unemployment among youth and low-skilled individuals, for example, is a massive problem not only in the crisis-mired southern European countries, but also in countries such as Slovakia and Ireland. In these countries, this situation has additionally developed into an extremely high rate of long-term unemployment. This is particularly worrisome given that long-term unemployment figures among the greatest risk factors for poverty and social exclusion. Also problematic are distinct trends in almost all countries toward a dual labor market, with in some cases dramatic increases in atypical forms of employment with a low degree of vertical permeability. In Spain and Cyprus, for example, more than 90 percent of people with temporary work contracts are involuntarily in this kind of employment.

Social cohesion and non-discrimination: This dimension of the Social Justice Index assesses the degree to which tendencies toward social polarization, exclusion and discrimination against certain groups are successfully counteracted. Overall, Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, Luxembourg and Germany perform best in this category. Tendencies toward discrimination and polarization are effectively prevented in the still comparatively egalitarian societies of the Nordic countries. However, even in these small and homogeneous states, income polarization is increasing (except Finland); moreover, particularly for people of foreign origin, labor market and educational opportunities are narrower than for natives and people without an immigrant background. For this reason, the Nordic countries are not given top scores for their integration policies. Moreover, while all EU member states face the challenge of providing equal opportunities for participation to people with immigrant backgrounds, a number of EU countries also show very significant tendencies toward discrimination against specific minorities. This is particularly true with regard to the Roma, who are subject to significant restrictions and discrimination in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia, among other nations. These population groups broadly lack equal opportunities for self-realization.

Health: In any assessment of social justice, the question of the greatest possible inclusiveness in access to high-quality health care services must also be taken into consideration. Social participation can be significantly constrained as a result of poor health. Very good conditions in this respect prevail in Sweden, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium, while Romania and Latvia show the greatest shortcomings. The massive underfunding of the Romanian health care system, for example, leads to broad treatment inequalities and corruption. Problems in Greece have

taken a similar course. There, harsh austerity measures have led to drastic cuts in the health care system. In addition, rising poverty has meant that many people are no longer in the position to undergo essential treatments.

Intergenerational justice: Social justice is ultimately also a question of the allocation of participation opportunities between the young and the old. Current generations should not live at the expense of future generations. Unjust transfers of burdens and negative economic, social and environmental consequences should be avoided. In the overall assessment of this dimension, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Estonia are clear leaders. Despite significant demographic pressures, these countries best succeed in investing in opportunities for young people and families. These countries also perform well with regard to the questions of environmental and fiscal sustainability and investment in research and development; thus, they are most likely to fulfill the complex, multidimensional demands of intergenerationally just policies. By contrast, the greatest shortcomings with regard to intergenerational justice are evident in the demographically “old” and highly indebted crisis states of Italy and Greece. Here, in the interest of future generations, budgetary consolidation must without question take a high priority. However, to the greatest degree possible, care should be taken in the course of this fiscal consolidation to maintain investment in policy areas that are particularly relevant to the future. Massive cuts in areas such as education or research and development, as have recently been observed in Spain, for example, are self-defeating from the perspectives both of social justice and of member states’ future economic viability. Cuts in these areas are particularly counterproductive and endanger the future viability of the countries concerned.



2. Introduction

“Social justice” is a central constitutive element of the legitimacy and stability of any political community.³ Yet defining what social justice means and how best to achieve it is often subject to considerable controversy. The conceptual boundaries of social justice are continually in flux because the idea is a result of culturally and historically dependent value systems. Nevertheless, a modern concept of social justice that refers to the aim of realizing equal opportunities and life chances provides us a conceptual ideal able to garner the consensus needed for a sustainable social market economy. This paradigm suggests that establishing social justice depends less on compensating for exclusion than it does on investing in inclusion. Instead of an “equalizing” distributive justice or a simply formal equality of life chances in which the rules of the game and codes of procedure are applied equally, this concept of justice is concerned with guaranteeing each individual genuinely equal opportunities for self-realization through the targeted investment in the development of individual “capabilities”.⁴

Thus, within the scope of his or her own personal freedom, every individual should be empowered to pursue a self-determined course of life, and to participate in society more broadly. Specific social backgrounds, such as membership in a particular social group or demographic category would not, according to this concept of social justice, be allowed to negatively affect one’s opportunities to succeed in life.⁵ By focusing on opportunities for self-realization, such a concept avoids the blind spots of an efficient market-driven, simply formal procedural justice on the one hand and a compensatory distributional justice on the other, and thus ultimately establishes a bridge between rival political ideologies.⁶

Government policies of redistribution function as an instrument of social justice and are conceived in terms of an investment rather than compensation. Within the conceptual framework of economic and social participation, redistributing resources within a community are a legitimate, if not essential, means of empowering all to take advantage of the opportunities around them. In this sense, social justice can be understood as a guiding principle for a participatory society that activates and enables its members. A sustainable social market economy able to combine the principles of market efficiency with those of social justice requires the state to take on a role that goes beyond that of a “night watchman.” It requires a strong state led by actors who understand the need for social equity as a means of ensuring participation opportunities.

³ This chapter and several other conceptual and methodological parts of this study contain elements of the previous publication “Social Justice in the OECD – How Do the Member States Compare” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2011).

⁴ See Sen (1993; 2009); Merkel (2001; 2007); Merkel/Giebler (2009), p. 192-194.

⁵ See Rawls (1971); on the underlying principles of “equal opportunity” see Roemer (1998: 1) who distinguishes between a ‘level-the-playing-field principle’ and a ‘nondiscrimination principle’: “An instance of the first principle is that compensatory education be provided for children from disadvantaged social backgrounds, so that a larger proportion of them will acquire skills required to compete, later on, for jobs against persons with more advantaged childhoods. An instance of the second principle is that race or sex, as such, should not count for or against a person’s eligibility for a position, when race or sex is an irrelevant attribute insofar as the performance of the duties of the position is concerned.” The concept of social justice applied in the present report covers both principles. It is important to note that the concept of social justice employed here emphasizes less the principle of equality per se than it does the principle of individual freedom, which can be exercised only when the state and a society establish the most level playing field possible for the pursuit of life chances. See in this regard Merkel/Giebler (2009: 193-195).

⁶ See Vehrkamp (2007), p. 11.

The Social Justice Index presented here is informed by this paradigm and encompasses those areas of policy that are particularly important for developing individual capabilities and opportunities for participation in society. In addition to the fundamental issue of preventing poverty, the Social Justice Index explores areas related to an inclusive education system, labor market access, social cohesion, health and intergenerational justice.

In so doing, the Social Justice Index dovetails with current EU efforts to monitor social affairs in the member states as mandated in the ten-year strategy issued by the European Commission in 2010, “Europe 2020: A European Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth” (hereafter referred to as the Europe 2020 strategy). This includes those initiatives associated with the Social Protection Performance Monitor⁷ of the Social Protection Committee and the European Commission’s recent recommendation to institute a Social Scoreboard that keep track of key employment and social indicators. As part of the European Semester, these instruments, which are connected to the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), are designed to chart progress made in expanding social inclusion within member states. The EU itself collects vast quantities of various data relevant to issues of social inclusion, all of which are open to public access through Eurostat, the EU’s statistical office.

While these efforts to institute regular reporting on key aspects of social inclusion in each member state are certainly worthwhile, there has not been – until now – an instrument that links features of social justice with specific indicators to deliver a conceptually cohesive and empirically meaningful statement on the state of social justice in each member state. The Social Justice Index presented here is designed to fill this gap and measure on a regular basis the progress made and the ground lost on issues of social justice in each EU member state. Together with the Reformbarometer (to be released by the end of 2014), which is under development by the Bertelsmann Stiftung and the London School of Economics, the Social Justice Index will help promote the social dimension of the Europe 2020 strategy by providing evidence-based analyses. In combination, these two tools will comprise a new instrument, the Social Inclusion Monitor Europe (SIM). Focused on the principle of participatory justice, the SIM will be used to assess and formulate concrete recommendations for policy reforms in individual member states and the EU as a whole.

SIM Europe’s aim is to provide an evidence-based approach to social policy change in the EU member states. Combining data on social policy outcomes with expert survey-based information on the scope and direction of government initiatives serves three purposes: a) to provide timely data (annually) in order to rebalance the predominance of the macroeconomic part of the EU’s economic governance; b) to issue comparable cross-country data on social policy reforms; and c) to show and disentangle governments’ trade-offs regarding austerity policies, i.e. point either to worsening social outcomes or reveal “hidden” social costs of initiated reforms.

⁷ See the recently published annual report of the Social Protection Committee (2014): Social Europe. Many ways, one objective.



This kind of instrument is necessary if the EU is to develop a truly integrated strategy for economic progress *and* social justice. To date, no such comprehensive and consistent strategy exists, despite current EU efforts to foster reporting on social indicators. The Europe 2020 strategy clearly puts forth a social dimension in which key indicators such as risk of poverty, employment rate, or early school-leaving rates are considered. Nonetheless, the overriding goal of this strategy is to promote economic growth. Europe 2020's language is clear in stating the need to ensure that such growth be sustainable and conducive to social cohesion, and therefore in keeping with the goals of inclusive growth. This language represents a major step forward in contrast to a concept of growth focused exclusively on economic indicators such as gross domestic product (GDP). However, a conceptually cohesive strategy explicitly targeting social justice across the EU has yet to be formulated. In recent years, issues such as economic recovery and fiscal consolidation through debt reduction and austerity measures have headlined agendas in European policy circles. Reporting on social indicators has been conducted in parallel to these discussions, though much of these efforts have gone unnoticed by the broader public. Raising awareness among the public of developments in social justice are instrumental to creating genuine political leverage capable of affecting change. Regular benchmarking in the form of a clearly communicable ranking can be of great help in this matter. The Social Justice Index ought to function as an illustrative example of how this can be achieved.

The following section explains the methodology underlying the Social Justice Index and its features. The index is based on quantitative and qualitative data collected by the Bertelsmann Stiftung within the framework of its SGI project (www.sgi-network.org). The SGI survey (third edition published in April 2014), which draws on 140 indicators, provides a systematic comparison of sustainable governance in 41 OECD and EU member states. Individual SGI indicators have been selected and aggregated for use in the Social Justice Index following a tested procedure for measuring social justice.⁸

Clearly, no set of indicators can be expected to fully represent the complexity of social reality on the ground. Creating an index involves, by definition, the condensation of vast amounts of information. It also demands, at times, that pragmatic decisions be made when selecting indicators, given the limitations set by the availability of comparable data. In-depth case studies of specific reform strategies within the member states are therefore required in order to provide a thicker description of the state of affairs in each policy area. The upcoming Reformbarometer will, at the end of the year, do exactly that: it will take a close-up look at the findings of the Social Justice Index and place them in the context of current national reform efforts. Combining these two perspectives on social inclusion in the EU, the two reports form the Social Inclusion Monitor Europe (SIM Europe) (www.social-inclusion-monitor.eu).

⁸ The approach and procedure used here is derived from Merkel (2001; 2007) and Merkel/Giebler (2009).

3. Methodology

Drawing upon Wolfgang Merkel's conceptual and empirical groundwork, we can differentiate several dimensions for measuring the construct of social justice.⁹ The Social Justice Index is composed of the following six dimensions: poverty prevention, equitable education, labor market access, social cohesion and non-discrimination, health as well as intergenerational justice.

As a cross-national survey, the Social Justice Index comprises 27 quantitative and eight qualitative indicators, each associated with one of the six dimensions of social justice.¹⁰ The data for the quantitative SGI indicators used in the Social Justice Index are derived primarily from Eurostat and the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). The qualitative indicators reflect the evaluations provided by more than 100 experts responding to the SGI's survey of the state of affairs in various policy areas throughout the OECD and EU (see www.sgi-network.org). For these indicators, the rating scale ranges from 1 (worst) to 10 (best). In order to ensure compatibility between the quantitative and qualitative indicators, all raw values for the quantitative indicators undergo linear transformation to give them a range of 1 to 10 as well.¹¹

According to Merkel and Giebler (2009), the first three dimensions of poverty prevention, equitable education, and labor market access carry the most conceptual value, which is why they are each weighted more heavily in creating the index. For the purposes of comparison, in addition to the weighted Social Justice Index, a non-weighted ranking was created in which the six dimensions were treated equally.¹² The findings discussed here derive from the weighted Social Justice Index.

The effective prevention of poverty plays a key role in measuring social justice. Under conditions of poverty, social participation and a self-determined life are possible only with great difficulty. The prevention of poverty is in a certain sense a *conditio sine qua non* for social justice, and thereby takes precedence to the other dimensions from the perspective of justice theory. For this reason, the dimension of poverty prevention is weighted most strongly – in this case, given triple weight – in the overall ranking.

⁹ The methods of measuring social justice applied here are derived from those applied by Merkel (2001; 2007) and the approach and argument provided by Merkel/Giebler (2009). In contrast to Merkel/Giebler (2009), the index comprises six instead of seven dimensions to be measured. In addition, the weighting process and indicator set have been modified and supplemented. We are indebted to Dr. Margit Kraus (Calculus Consult) for providing important advice and feedback on statistical and technical issues, imputing missing values, and constructing Excel spreadsheets for the aggregation of scores.

¹⁰ A full list and description of individual indicators is provided in the appendix.

¹¹ The period under review for the Sustainable Governance Indicators 2014 survey extends from May 2011 to May 2013 (www.sgi-network.org). The raw data for the Social Justice Index is provided in the appendix. In order to ensure comparability over time, we use the SGI's method of fixed minimum and maximum values for each indicator. See Schraad-Tischler/Seelkopf (2014).

¹² See Table 1 in the appendix, p. 94.




In line with the Europe 2020 strategy, the EU Social Justice Index uses the headline indicator “people at risk of poverty or social inclusion” to monitor poverty prevention. According to Eurostat, this indicator corresponds to the sum of persons who are “at risk of poverty or severely materially deprived or living in households with very low work intensity”.¹³ At risk-of-poverty is defined as those persons with an equivalized disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 percent of the national median equivalized disposable income (after social transfers). Material deprivation covers indicators relating to economic strain and durables. Severely materially deprived persons live in conditions severely constrained by a lack of resources. This means they cannot afford (and are therefore deprived of) at least four of the following nine items: 1) to pay rent or utility bills, 2) to keep their home adequately warm, 3) to face unexpected expenses, 4) to eat meat, fish or a protein equivalent every second day, 5) a week holiday away from home, 6) a car, 7) a washing machine, 8) a color TV, or 9) a telephone. People living in households with very low work intensity are those aged 0-59 living in households where the adults (aged 18-59) work less than 20 percent of their total work potential during the past year. Persons are only counted once even if they are present in several sub-indicators.¹⁴

Comprised of several sub-indicators, the conceptual reach of this headline indicator extends far beyond a simple measure of relative income poverty. Indeed, the inclusion of severe material deprivation points to the problem of measuring non-monetary poverty in highly developed industrial countries. In order to conduct an in-depth empirical analysis, we will also discuss the relevant sub-indicators of this particular headline indicator in the respective chapter on poverty prevention. As a result, age groups particularly at risk of poverty are accorded special attention, which is why poverty rates for children (0-17 years of age) and the elderly (65 and over) are also considered in the analysis.

¹³ Definitions taken from Eurostat’s “Dataset details” website at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/product_details/dataset?p_product_code=T2020_50.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Figure 2: Dimensions and indicators of the index



Source: Own representation.

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Equal access to good-quality education is another essential factor in providing equitable capabilities and opportunities for advancement (vertical mobility). Social, political and economic participation depends in large part on this public good. To this end, the state must take care that genuinely equal educational opportunities are available to every child. Social or cultural background must not be allowed to adversely affect educational success. The importance of such conditions is emphasized in the Social Justice Index by doubly weighting the access to education dimension. The dimension considers efforts to provide early-childhood education, the role of socioeconomic background in students' educational success (drawing on the latest PISA data as a basis), the rate of early school-leavers and, finally, a qualitative expert assessment of educational policies, focusing particularly on the provision of high-quality education and equitable access opportunities.



Assuring equity in education opportunities is primarily an ethical imperative, since weak access to education and social poverty generate a vicious circle in which those lacking education access are denied opportunities for social betterment, and the socially disadvantaged are denied access to education. Breaking this vicious circle is a matter of solidarity and key to maintaining the social fabric of society. At the same time, it makes good economic sense to nourish and apply the talents and abilities of everyone in society, as much as is possible.

The labor market's degree of inclusiveness is likewise of considerable importance to social justice, as an individual's status is defined in large part by his or her participation in the workforce. Exclusion from the labor market substantially limits individual opportunities for self-realization, contributes to an increase in the risk of poverty, and can even lead to serious health stresses: "So long as gainful employment remains the primary means by which not only income, but also status, self-respect and social inclusion are distributed in developed societies, inclusion in the labor market must be a high priority for a just society" (Merkel/Giebler 2009: 198). This dimension is therefore also counted doubly in the overall ranking. In order to do even rudimentary justice to the complexity of this dimension, four indicators apiece were used in the representation of employment and unemployment. Alongside the overall employment rate, the specific rates for 55- to 64-year-old workers, for foreign-born workers as compared to natives, and for women as compared to men are considered. In addition, the labor market inclusion dimension examines the overall unemployment rate, and is supplemented by the long-term unemployment rate and the degree of labor market exclusion experienced both by young and by low-skilled workers. Finally, three further indicators addressing the problem of precarious employment are included in this dimension: in-work poverty, the percentage of those persons involuntarily employed on a temporary basis as well as low-skilled low-wage earners as a proportion of all employees (excluding apprentices).

The dimension of social cohesion and non-discrimination examines the extent to which trends toward social polarization, exclusion and the discrimination of specific groups are successfully countered. This dimension is factored into the Social Justice Index with a normal weight. Income disparities, measured in terms of the Gini coefficient, are taken into account here as a potentially important factor of social polarization. However, from a social justice theory perspective, the issue of income inequality carries less conceptual salience relative to the first three dimensions of justice - namely poverty prevention, access to education and labor market inclusion.¹⁵ To capture progress made in terms of gender equality, the number of seats in national legislatures held by women compared to the number of seats held by men is also considered. This dimension also includes three qualitative indicators, each based on expert assessments. One of these indicators assesses how effectively social policies preclude social exclusion and decoupling from society, a second examines how effectively the state protects against discrimination based on gender, physical ability, ethnic origin, social status, political views or religion, and a third evaluates how effectively policies support the integration of migrants into society. The latter question covers

¹⁵ See Merkel/Giebler (2009), p. 199 f.

integration-related policies comprising a wide array of cultural, education and social policies in so far as they affect the status of migrants or migrant communities in society. The so-called NEET rate, which refers to the number of young persons aged 20 to 24 who are not in education, employment or training and therefore face limited opportunities of economic and societal participation, is also factored into this dimension.

The fifth dimension of the Social Justice Index covers questions of equity in the area of health. In 2008, the World Health Organization's Commission on Social Determinants of Health pointed to dramatic differences in health within and between countries that are closely linked with degrees of social disadvantage: "These inequities in health, avoidable health inequalities, arise because of the circumstances in which people grow, live, work, and age, and the systems put in place to deal with illness. The conditions in which people live and die are, in turn, shaped by political, social, and economic forces. Social and economic policies have a determining impact on whether a child can grow and develop to its full potential and live a flourishing life, or whether its life will be blighted."¹⁶ Given these considerations, an assessment of social justice must also take into account the issue of health. However, identifying meaningful indicators for which data are available for all EU states is not an easy task. Nevertheless, there are some indicators giving us at least a basic impression of differing degrees of fairness, inclusiveness and quality between the EU countries' health systems. We use four quantitative indicators and one qualitative indicator. The qualitative indicator from our SGI survey assesses to what extent policies provide high-quality, inclusive and cost-efficient health care. The rationale behind the question is that public health care policies should aim at providing high-quality health care for the largest possible share of the population, at the lowest possible costs. Of the three criteria - quality, inclusiveness and cost efficiency - quality and inclusiveness are given priority over cost efficiency. Two quantitative indicators are drawn from the European Health Consumer Index (EHCI): the first captures the outcome performance of each country's health system; the second addresses the question of accessibility and range of services. Finally, we also use the indicators "healthy life expectancy at birth" and "self-reported unmet needs for medical help" as provided by Eurostat. As inequalities in health can be seen as being strongly determined by misguided developments in other areas, such as poverty prevention, education or the labor market, the health dimension is factored into the index with a normal weight.

The sixth dimension of the Social Justice Index approaches the issue of intergenerational justice. The issue at stake here is the need for contemporary generations to lead lives they value without compromising the ability of future generations to do the same. This dimension, which is factored into the index with a simple weight, is comprised of three components. The first component addresses policy support for both younger and older generations. The former is captured through the SGI's qualitative "family policy" indicator, the latter through the "pension policy" indicator, which is also qualitative. In order to reflect each country's specific demographic challenge, the

¹⁶ Cf. at www.who.int/social_determinants/thecommission/finalreport/en/index.html.




old-age dependency ratio is also considered here. The second component focuses on the idea of environmental sustainability and measures this on the one hand with the help of a qualitative indicator for environmental and resource protection policy, on the other through two quantitative indicators: greenhouse gas emissions in CO₂ equivalents per capita and the share of energy from renewable resources in gross final energy consumption. The third component, which is concerned with economic and fiscal sustainability, is comprised of two quantitative indicators. The first of which highlights public spending on research and innovation as an investment in future prosperity, and the second points to national debt levels as a mortgage to be paid by future generations.

4. Empirical findings

I Poverty prevention

The Europe 2020 strategy aims to “promote social inclusion, in particular through the reduction of poverty, by aiming to lift at least 20 million people out of the risk of poverty and social exclusion”.¹⁷ To date, however, the EU is far from achieving this goal, as evidenced by the most recent Eurostat data.

Figure 3: Poverty Prevention



Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012, 2013).

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According to EU figures, around 25.4 percent of people in the European Union are at risk of poverty or social exclusion (as of 2013), a figure 1.7 percentage points higher than that in 2009. This increase is in large part attributable to the severe economic and financial crisis that in numerous countries has led to a dramatic increase in unemployment (see section III). However, problems associated with the risk of poverty and social exclusion are manifest to varying degrees across the 28 EU member states. The best-performing countries in this regard are the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Sweden, with rates between 14.6 percent and 15.6 percent, while Romania and Bulgaria fall clearly at the tail end of the comparison. In these countries, 41.7 percent (Romania) and even 49.3 percent (Bulgaria) of people are at risk of poverty or social exclusion. The SGI country experts indicate that “poverty levels in Romania remain among the highest in the European Union. More than 30 percent of the population lives on less than \$5 per day, while over 50 percent of its inhabitants are either unemployed or underemployed (...)”.¹⁷ In Bulgaria, 45.9 percent of people suffer from severe material deprivation. Numerous basic requirements of daily (social) life remain denied to these people. This is the unhappily negative record within the EU.

Overall, the EU shows a clear north-south divide that has further intensified in recent years. While the wealthy countries of northern Europe have also been significantly affected by the crisis, countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Luxembourg and Austria continue to be clear leaders in international comparison in terms of poverty prevention. The Netherlands and Finland were even able to make gains over the last five to seven years, somewhat reducing the share of their populations at risk of poverty and social exclusion. And despite the crisis-driven deterioration in employment and unemployment figures, poverty rates in Sweden, Luxembourg, Austria and Denmark remain comparatively low – not only in terms of relative poverty, but also with regard to the extent of severe material deprivation in particular.


Other countries demonstrating similarly good performance in poverty prevention include France, Germany and Slovenia. Thanks to positive employment developments in Germany, the country has in recent years been able to improve slightly on the poverty and social exclusion indicator. Germany’s at-risk rate was 19.6 percent in 2012, down from 20.6 percent in 2007. However, the fact that nearly one-fifth of the German population remains at risk of poverty or social exclusion according to the Eurostat figures should continue to give policymakers considerable food for thought. Nevertheless, in interpreting these figures, the various aspects of the indicator must be considered in relation to one another. For example, Germany’s improvement in the leading indicator of poverty and social exclusion is above all attributable to the fact that the share of people living in households with very low work intensity has fallen in recent years, thanks to positive labor market developments (from 11.5% 2007 to 9.9% in 2012). In contrast, the risk of poverty as defined by relative income poverty, based on the entire population, has in the same period risen by 0.9 percentage points (from 15.2% to 16.1%), even though Germany is among the top-ranking

¹⁷ http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/product_details/dataset?p_product_code=T2020_50.

¹⁸ Ganev/Dimitrov/Bönker (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

states in the EU with regard to preventing severe material deprivation. This latter point is a particularly critical issue from the perspective of social justice, and Germany bears a comparatively low rate of 4.9 percent on a whole-population basis. On this measure, only Luxembourg, Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark and Austria have lower rates than Germany.

Figure 4: At Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion, Total Population



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012, 2013).

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Standing in contrast to this (expanded) top group, at the lower end of the poverty-prevention ranking (figure 3) sit the southern and southeast European countries, which have in most cases experienced further significant increases in poverty and social exclusion during the course of the crisis. The clearest example in this regard is Greece, which recorded an increase of more than six percentage points to 34.6 percent in 2012. In the same period, the extent of severe material deprivation in Greece has risen by more than eight percentage points to an appalling 19.5 percent. Given the currently disastrous situation in the Greek labor market, it can be assumed that poverty and social exclusion in the country have worsened even further since, and that this will be reflected in the Eurostat figures for 2013 and 2014, which have yet to be released. The evaluations of the SGI country experts for Greece also point in this direction: “After the crisis erupted, social exclusion became more acute, while relative poverty probably also increased. Owing to the lack of recent data, it is difficult to document the size of poverty increase resulting from the crisis. (...) Poverty probably became higher in 2011 – 2013 when the government affected wage cuts in both the public and the private sectors. In 2011 – 2013 the government announced an improvement in child allowances distributed to families in need. Local governments opened shelters and soup kitchens to help. Given the depth of the crisis, such measures probably proved inadequate. In sum, past negligence in the field of anti-poverty and social exclusion on the part of successive governments have left the most vulnerable strata of Greek society unprepared to sustain the effects of the economic crisis. In 2011 – 2013 social exclusion accelerated and few, if any, measures were taken to balance the adverse effects of the crisis. Relevant policies failed to prevent social exclusion and to open up social opportunities.”¹⁹

Developments in Italy and Spain suggest a similar trajectory for poverty as that seen in Greece. In both Italy and Spain, the crisis has facilitated a significant increase in the numbers of those at risk of poverty and social exclusion. In 2007, a total of 23.3 percent of Spain’s population was already affected; by 2013, this rate had risen to 27.3 percent. In Italy, meanwhile, about 28.4 percent of people in 2013 were at risk of poverty and social exclusion. The rate of serious material deprivation increased there from 6.8 percent to 12.4 percent between 2007 and 2013. Significant deterioration in recent years has also been evident in Ireland, where the crisis has left its mark in the social sphere, as well as in Hungary, which under the Orban government has suffered in almost every policy area, including poverty prevention (see the country reports at www.sgi-network.org).

The midrange from 12th to 18th place (figure 3) is relatively heterogeneous, and encompasses with Belgium, Malta, Estonia, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Poland and Cyprus a range of EU member countries bearing (in some cases) very different welfare-state traditions. The underwhelming performance of the United Kingdom here is striking, as it falls below both Slovakia and the new EU member state of Estonia on the headline indicator of poverty and social-exclusion risk. By contrast, the positive developments in Poland are particularly noteworthy. While in 2007, the country still showed one of the EU’s highest rates on this indicator, at 34.4 percent, this value has

¹⁹ Sotiropoulos/Featherstone/Karadag (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

since fallen to 25.8 percent (2013). Among most of the post-communist welfare states of Eastern and Central Europe, it is also striking that a relatively large difference exists between relative income poverty on the one hand, and material deprivation on the other. When looking at the EU-SILC data for the 28 EU member states, the differences between income poverty and severe material deprivation become clearer. Given the still relatively low levels of income polarization in most post-communist EU states, income poverty rates here are also comparatively low. According to the EU's measurement of income poverty, countries like Hungary or Slovakia have relatively low income-poverty rates (respectively 14.3% and 12.8%). However, at the same time, they show medium-to-high levels of severe material deprivation as measured by EU standards (26.8% and 10.2% respectively).²⁰ An exception here is the Czech Republic, which places first in this dimension of the Social Justice Index. According to the most recent Eurostat figures, the Czech Republic enjoys low income poverty (8.6%) and severe material deprivation (6.6%) rates. A case such as this illustrates why the use of the composite poverty and social exclusion indicator, which combines income poverty, material deprivation and the number of people in households with low work intensity, is quite reasonable, and considerably more meaningful than a simple consideration of relative income poverty. However, with this so-called headline indicator of the Europe 2020 strategy, it must also be taken into account that average income levels in the post-communist states still lie considerably below those in Western Europe. In addition, poverty lines have to some extent shifted in the member states over the last several years, in large part due to the crisis.


The causes of poverty are undoubtedly complex. Poverty can in part be attributed to the limits of a national government's short- and medium-term discretionary power. In many ways, however, poverty reflects the consequences of weak policymaking in areas such as education, labor market and integration policy. From the perspective of social justice, the battle against child poverty tops the list of issues in need of urgent attention because of the profound way in which it undermines the goal of establishing greater equality of life chances. A society that deprives many of its youngest members the opportunities of participation is wasting potential and undermining itself.

Thus, if in addition to the headline indicator of poverty and social exclusion relative to a country's entire population, one considers the corresponding national figures specifically for the share of children (0 to 17 years of age) at risk of poverty and social exclusion, the following disturbing overall picture emerges. The average rate EU-wide is 28 percent, significantly higher than the corresponding ratio for the overall population (25.4%). This highlights the fact that there are several regions in the EU where the basic conditions needed for social justice are not being met. Moreover, children face a much higher risk of poverty and social exclusion than do elderly people. The EU-wide rate for persons 65 years of age and over is "only" 21.7 percent.

²⁰ Fusco/Guio/Marlier (2010: 36) show that poverty and material deprivation measures are clearly associated: "However, even if the level of deprivation tends to decrease with income, this relationship is neither monotonic (individuals in the bottom of the income distribution are not always the most deprived) nor linear (the slope of this diminution varies across the distribution)."



Figure 5: Severe Material Deprivation, Total Population




Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012, 2013).

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The risk of poverty and social exclusion among children also shows significant variance within the European Union. Finland, Denmark and Sweden clearly lead the pack in a positive sense with the lowest rates, between 1.3 percent and 15.4 percent. Moreover, the rate of severe material deprivation among young people (below 18) ranges between 1.4 percent in Sweden and 3.6 percent in Denmark. This shows that in the northern European welfare states, the problem of severe material deprivation among children is not a major challenge, even though Denmark has seen an increase in the respective material deprivation rate since 2009 (an increase of 1.5%).

Figure 6: Population Living in Quasi-jobless Households



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012, 2013).

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In Germany, the share of children and youth at risk of poverty and social exclusion has declined further in recent years, from 21.7 percent in 2010 to 18.4 percent in 2012. In this regard, not only has the share of children at risk of income poverty fallen, from 17.5 percent in 2010 to 15.2 percent in 2012 (in 2007, the rate was 14.1%), the share of children and youth living under conditions of severe material deprivation has also recently declined, to 4.8 percent (2009: 7.1%). However, the fact that nearly one in 20 children in the EU's largest economy continues to suffer from significant material deprivation must simply not be tolerated. Especially noteworthy are variations across regions in Germany (with Berlin and Bremen at the bottom and the southernmost Länder of



Figure 7: At Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion, Children (0-17)



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012, 2013).


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Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg at the top), as well as differences according to family structure: Around half of all children affected by poverty in Germany live in single-parent households, which are particularly vulnerable.²¹ Regional differences are also pronounced with regard to the poverty risk among children due to rising rents especially in larger cities.²²

²¹ Bertelsmann Stiftung (2014): Alleinerziehende unter Druck. Available at http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbr/SID-F6CFDB16-E3CE15F1/bst/xcms_bst_dms_39498_39499_2.pdf.

²² Bertelsmann Stiftung (2013b): Wohnungsangebot für arme Familien in Großstädten. Available at http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbr/SID-92B78C66-466C63D9/bst/xcms_bst_dms_39561_39562_2.pdf.

Figure 8: Severe Material Deprivation, Children (0-17)



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012, 2013).

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Bringing up the rear at the last two ranks on the issue of child poverty are Bulgaria and Romania. In both countries, more than 50 percent of children are at risk of poverty or social exclusion – a more than dismaying finding from the perspective of social justice. This conclusion is underscored by the fact that rates of severe material deprivation are also extremely high. In Bulgaria, 51 percent of children and youth are affected by severe material deprivation, along with 34.4 percent in Romania. The discrepancy relative to the best-ranked northern European countries is immense, and highlights just how far the European Union remains from achieving a convergence of living standards among the member states.



The weak performance of the United Kingdom is once again noteworthy in this regard. A total of 31.2 percent of children there are at risk of poverty or social exclusion. This puts the country at 18th place – just ahead of the two crisis-battered nations of Spain (32.6%) and Italy (31.9%).


A quick look at the risk of poverty and exclusion among the elderly (65 years and older) is also quite revealing. The EU's widest span of values is evident here. While just 6.1 percent of people face this social risk in top-placed Luxembourg, the corresponding rate in last-place Bulgaria is almost 10 times as high (59.1%). The enormous welfare discrepancy within the EU becomes even more clear when considering the rates of severe material deprivation among older people. In Luxembourg and Sweden, just a respective 0 percent and 0.4 percent of the elderly are affected by severe material deprivation. In contrast, this rate is 53 percent in Bulgaria. The rate in Germany is 2.8 percent – thus, much lower than in the case of material deprivation among children. However, the SGI country experts point to the danger that “the risk of exclusion for the older generation will rise, due to lower expected pensions and increasing social isolation derived from the loosening of family ties”.²³

Elsewhere, a look at Spain shows that the crisis affected the development of poverty in different age groups there very differently. While “only” 14.5 percent of older people there are at risk of poverty or social exclusion (and only 2.7 percent suffer under severe material deprivation), the corresponding rate for children is roughly twice as high – and even more than three times as high with regard to the number of Spanish children living under circumstances of severe material deprivation (8.3%). Interestingly, Spain performs better than Finland, the United Kingdom and Sweden with respect to the risk of poverty and exclusion among older people. This is mainly due to the fact that the headline indicator of risk of poverty or social exclusion is comprised not only of the aspect of material deprivation, but also the aspect (among others) of relative income poverty, which is measured with regard to individual national income levels. With regard to income poverty among the older population, Spain shows a comparatively low rate of 12.7 percent, while the corresponding rates in Sweden and Finland are 17.7 percent and 16.1 percent. Germany comes in at 15 percent. In many countries as well as on EU-average, we even observe a decline in poverty among elderly people. However, this effect must be interpreted within the context of a decrease in average income levels, which informs relative poverty calculations.

The southeast European states of Bulgaria and Romania, along with the Baltic countries of Lithuania and Latvia (with these latter two ranking at 25th and 27th place respectively), offer a more negative perspective on the issue of old-age poverty. Latvia performs equally poorly in all age groups, including child poverty, and never manages to rise above the last four places in the various rankings.

²³ Rüb/Ulbricht/Heinemann/Zohlhörer (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

Figure 9: At Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion, Seniors (65+)



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012, 2013).

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The comparison of EU member states shows that poverty and social exclusion in wealthy countries is not necessarily a simple fact of modern-day life but can be combated with success – as shown by countries such as the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Sweden. Social participation is in no way exclusively a function of economic power, government spending or certain welfare-state traditions. Rather, it can be achieved when priorities are set and socially disadvantaged groups receive targeted support.



Figure 10: Severe Material Deprivation, Seniors (65+)




Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012, 2013).

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II Equitable education

In looking initially at the overall ranking for this dimension of the Social Justice Index, it can be seen that the top six places are held by the Nordic EU member states of Sweden, Denmark and Finland, the two Baltic countries of Lithuania and Estonia, as well as new EU member country Croatia. By contrast, the lowest-ranking countries, each with less than five points, are Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Greece.

Figure 11: Equitable Education



Source: Own calculations (Data used for constructing this composite indicator refer to the periods a: 2005-2007; b: 2008-2010; c: 2011-2013).

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Over the course of recent years, Luxembourg has shown the greatest improvements among the 28 EU countries in terms of equitable access to education, while Slovakia has deteriorated the most significantly. But what are the individual factors driving these rather coarse-grained overall findings?

From a perspective of social justice, it is particularly important that to the extent possible, a student's socioeconomic background has no effect on his or her educational success. This principle is realized to the greatest degree in Estonia and Finland. Indeed, Finland has for years performed as one of the best countries not only among all EU member states, but also among all OECD countries. In their most recent report, the SGI experts explicitly emphasize the government's positive management measures in this regard: "Adopted by the government every four years, the Education and Research Development Plan is the key document of education and research policy in Finland and directs the implementation of education and research policy goals as stated in the Government Program. From 2011 to 2016, the plan will focus on the alleviation of poverty, inequality and exclusion."²⁴

Moreover, students in Finland and Estonia also have the highest PISA performance scores in the EU. This shows that high equity and high performance are certainly not opposing or impossible policy objectives. The good performance of Lithuania with regard to equitable educational opportunities should also be emphasized along with that of its neighbors Estonia and Finland. Here, however, the SGI country experts point to various aspects still to be improved: "In terms of equitable access to education, the country shows an urban-rural divide and some disparities in educational achievements between girls and boys. However, there are no significant gaps in access to education for vulnerable groups (with the exception of the Roma population and, to a certain extent, the migrant population)."²⁵


In contrast to Estonia and Finland, the achievements of Lithuanian students are below average in the PISA comparison. A similar finding is evident in Sweden, which – despite the outright collapse shown by Swedish students in the last PISA educational-achievements survey – remains very equitable in terms of access to education, and even takes top place among the 28 EU member states on the basis of the indicators used in the present index. The SGI country experts even come to the somewhat pointed conclusion that "if anything, the system is 'too equitable' in that requirements to enter some programs in university are so low that basically all who apply are admitted, resulting in a 'race to the bottom' in tertiary education standards".²⁶ Ideally, an education system should, in addition to facilitating equal opportunity, result in strong academic performance, as is the case in Estonia and Finland.

²⁴ Anckar/Kuitto/Oberst/Jahn (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

²⁵ Nakrošis/Vilpišauskas/Jahn (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

²⁶ Pierre/Jochem/Jahn (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

Figure 12: PISA, Impact of Socioeconomic Factors on Educational Performance



Source: OECD PISA (data refer to a: 2006; b: 2009; c: 2012).

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In the case of Poland, which performs best among the EU's Central and Eastern European countries with respect to the relationship between socioeconomic background and student success, and which in recent years has shown a clear upward trend in the area of education, the country experts point to the various reforms that have been implemented since the first Tusk government. For example, in September 2011, preschool education for five-year-olds was made obligatory – a constructive step from the perspective of social justice.²⁷

²⁷ Matthes/Markowski/Bönker (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.



Despite improvements over the last five years, Luxembourg continues to face fundamental structural problems in the area of equitable educational opportunities, according to the SGI experts: “The country’s education policy must deal with the challenges of a multilingual society and a high proportion of migrant students. The education system is particularly marked by its insistence on early selection: after six years of primary school, students face a crucial junction and must choose one of two academic tracks, general or technical. There is a marked division between Luxembourg nationals and migrant students, as generally migrants (especially the Portuguese minority) struggle with languages and are more often tracked to the technical level (secondaire technique), which affects their progress toward a university education. To avoid this, often more affluent migrants will send their children to a reputable international school. This leads to yet another division between higher-income and lower-income migrants. According to the PISA study (2009), girls outperform boys in reading while boys get better results in mathematics and science. According to OECD data (Education at a Glance), Luxembourg spends the most per student at €18,858 per year, per student yet has one of the highest dropout rates. The OECD Review of Evaluation and Assessment in Education also identified ‘a major performance disadvantage for students with an immigrant background.’”²⁸

The recent improvements in the United Kingdom with respect to the “relationship between socio-economic background and educational performance” indicator are interesting. It remains too early to be able to assess whether the reforms implemented here in recent years will show lasting effect. In their current report, the SGI country experts offer a nuanced view of policy successes and continuing challenges: “The coalition has continued to pursue the marketization started by its New Labour predecessors in education. It has liberalized the school sector to enable non-governmental organizations such as foundations, businesses, parent-and-teacher corporations, etc. to found their own schools. This has been contentious within the coalition, however. The core approach of education policy is to improve performance by boosting inter-school competition, mainly through performance tables administered by the regulator Ofsted. Programs like the Pupil Premium are designed to encourage good schools to accept disadvantaged children and thus improve education while strengthening social cohesion. However, the socioeconomic composition of many of the country’s schools still poses a significant challenge for disadvantaged students and those with an immigrant background. Cuts in the education budget (by 5.7 percent in 2012) and re-allocations have further added to the problems of the sector. The United Kingdom – more accurately England, as Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have different systems – still has a pronounced divide between those who opt for private education (confusingly, known as public school) and those who go through the state system. There is a concern about pupils leaving school with no qualifications, and occasional alarms about certain segments of the youth population doing significantly worse than others. Exam results for late secondary pupils have been improving, but there has been an accusation that marking standards have slipped, leading the current education minister to push for tougher, more discriminating standards. Other debates concern the exercise of control by local authorities over

²⁸ Hartmann-Hirsch/Schneider/Lorig/Bandelow (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

the school system, with some attempt to weaken it, as mentioned above. In the higher education sector, the drastic increase of tuition fees (from £3,300 to between £6,000 and £9,000 per annum) has been highly contentious. The effect on student enrollment cannot yet be assessed, although previous steps to push more of the costs of higher education from the general taxpayer to the student do not appear to have inhibited access for students from poorer backgrounds.”²⁹

Socioeconomic background shows the greatest influence on a student’s educational performance in France, Bulgaria and Slovakia. With regard to Slovakia, the SGI experts fault in particular the fact that “the government does not plan to improve the funding of the severely underfinanced education system, arguing that fiscal sustainability does not allow bigger spending in this sector”.³⁰ Even in a country such as Austria, which despite recent improvements is ranked at just 23rd place on this important indicator, further fundamental reforms in the area of education are necessary in order to increase the system’s social mobility and ensure equal educational opportunities. Here, the SGI country experts above all criticize “the early division of children into multiple educational tracks, which takes place after the fourth grade. The result is that parents’ social status is reflected in students’ ability to access higher education, more so than in comparable countries. A citizens’ initiative that called on parliament to correct this negative process of selection failed to produce significant reform, at least in the short term. This state of affairs violates the concept of social justice, and at the same time fails to exploit the national population’s talents to the fullest. The hesitancy to engage in reform results in part from the considerable veto power held by specific groups, including the teachers’ union and the Austrian conservative party. Both appear to be first and foremost interested in defending the special status of high-school teachers, and appear worried that this status will be lost if the two-tier organization of schools is changed. (...) Access to the Austrian university system has become increasingly unequal in recent years, with children of parents holding tertiary education degrees and/or having higher incomes enjoying significantly better odds of successfully graduating from university”.³¹

Germany shows problems similar to those in Austria. Equality of opportunity in the German education system is insufficient. Although slight improvements have recently been evident, educational success continues to depend strongly on a child’s origin and socioeconomic background. The probability that a child from a socially disadvantaged background does well at school is significantly lower than in many other developed countries. A modest 15th place among all EU countries should be sufficient impetus to react on this indicator with strengthened countermeasures. In the most recent report, the SGI country experts underscore the fact that the German educational system – as compared with those of other advanced industrial nations – is segregated and socially selective. Indeed, it is precisely the educational opportunities of students from immigrant families and children from lower-income groups that are less highly developed. This suggests that the

²⁹ Busch/Begg/Bandelow (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

³⁰ Kneuer/Malova/Bönker (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

³¹ Pelinka/Winter-Ebmer/Zohlnhöfer (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.



education system has not yet been sufficiently adapted to the growing heterogeneity of children and youth in Germany.³²

Investing in early-childhood education is a key component of efforts to level the playing field in this regard. Numerous studies show that investments of this kind have positive effects on later academic opportunities, job prospects and overall chances for social advancement. Countries that make early and well-targeted investments in the capabilities and opportunities of the youngest members of their societies act not only in a morally sound, but also in an economically useful way.³³

The need for action to be taken on this front is great in several EU states. Moreover, it is important that funding for social transfers not be pitted against infrastructure funding if a society is to create the material conditions needed to lift disadvantaged children out of their precarious situation. Unfortunately, there is no sound or complete data on the quality of early-childhood education internationally. Consequently, the Social Justice Index must refer instead to a quantitative indicator measuring the level of public spending on early-childhood education, which allows at least an estimation of the financial priority given to the issue by a government.

Denmark, Hungary and Bulgaria show the highest levels of public spending in the EU on this form of investment in the future. In Hungary and Bulgaria, where the correlations between socioeconomic background and academic achievement are very high, the governments are at least pointing their efforts in the right direction when it comes to combating this problem. Only time will tell to what extent these investments yield genuine improvements in educational justice. Despite having increased public spending on early-childhood education, Germany's spending on this area continues to hover among EU average levels. In addition, the relatively low qualification standards for pre-primary education in Germany do not reflect the importance of support provided during the first few years of a child's life.³⁴

PISA study results are clear about the impact of pre-primary education: "Students who attended pre-primary school tend to perform better than students who have not. This advantage is greater in school systems where pre-primary education lasts longer, where there are smaller pupil-to-teacher ratios at the pre-primary level and where there is higher public expenditure per pupil at that level of education."³⁵


³² Rüb/Ulbricht/Heinemann/Zohlhörer (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

³³ See also the study "Intergenerational Justice in the OECD," Bertelsmann Stiftung (2013), available at www.sgi-network.org.

³⁴ Rüb/Heinemann/Zohlhörer (2011: 40), available at www.sgi-network.org.

³⁵ OECD (2010), <http://www.oecd.org/pisa/pisaproducts/46619703.pdf>.

Figure 13: Pre-primary Education Expenditure



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2006; b: 2008; c: 2011).


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The PISA study results also point to another key factor shaping just opportunities in education: The earlier children are tracked and separated according to performance, the greater the influence of socioeconomic background on their educational success. At the same time, however, overall performance does not improve as a result of early onset tracking. In other words, integrative school systems in which children are not separated early on according to their capabilities are a better alternative in terms of learning success and educational justice.



Another important indicator with regard to a country's just educational opportunities is the rate of early leavers from school and training programs. In the Europe 2020 strategy, this is one of the headline indicators in the area of education.³⁶ The targets for the 2020 strategy foresee reducing the share of early school and training leavers between 18 and 24 years of age to below 10 percent. The overall EU trend is in fact on the decline (from 13.4% in 2008 to 10.4% in 2013); however, a very large variance within the European Union remains evident.

Figure 14: Early School Leavers



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013).

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³⁶ Early leavers from education and training: The indicator is defined as the percentage of the population aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education (ISCED levels 0, 1, 2 or 3 c short) and who were not in further education or training during the last four weeks preceding the survey.

Young people leave school or training programs early most infrequently in Croatia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Poland, and most often in Portugal, Malta and Spain. Germany, with an early-leaving rate of about 10 percent, sits in the middle of the rankings. In this context, however, it must be noted that EU member states have very different educational and training systems. This is particularly true in the area of vocational training. Croatia, for example, shows the lowest share of early leavers from education and training programs, at 3.7 percent. However, in their report, the SGI country experts fault the fact that “vocational education is very weak and there is a high degree of mismatch between what is taught and the demands of employers, so vocational education is not a route to a job”.³⁷ In Slovenia, which lies just behind Croatia with a rate of 3.9 percent, the country experts point to difficulties that also relate to vocational training: “The most pressing problems are a small share of pupils enlisted in vocational education and in fields such as engineering, and an underfunded tertiary education system with low completion rates. A White Paper on Education, prepared between 2009 and 2011, has provided some guidance for reform. The measures adopted have focused on changes in the curriculum and on public campaigns for vocational education.”³⁸

Spain, with an early school-leaving rate of 23.6 percent, is currently the farthest from the overall low rates in Croatia and Slovenia, even though a reduction in early school-leaving figures has been observed here in recent years; in 2008, the early leaving rate of 18- to 24-year-olds was 31.7 percent. The SGI country experts describe a mixed picture in terms of developments and prospects in the Spanish educational system, in large part due to the current austerity policies: “Since the 1980s the goals of creating a Spanish education system that guarantees equality of opportunity for students and increases the graduate output of upper secondary and tertiary education have been largely achieved, despite problems of quality and others related to efficiency problems (such as early school-leaving for almost 25 percent of the young population or a poor contribution from education policy toward providing a skilled labor force). Notwithstanding this, there is now an observable drop in school failure and more emphasis on professional training. On the other hand, there are fears of a decline regarding equity, because of the cuts in education spending since 2011 (now expenditure only reaches 5.6 percent GDP, far below the OECD average of 6.3 percent) and the increase in fees or conditions to get funding and scholarships, which could expel poorer students from the system.”³⁹

In examining the situation in Germany, which in terms of equitable educational opportunities still has considerable catching up to do, the country experts award good grades at least with regard to the dual vocational training system. “In general, Germany’s education system is strong in terms of vocational training, providing skilled workers with good job and income prospects. The rate of vocational education and training (i.e., the level of education that is either upper secondary or post-secondary but not tertiary education (ISCED levels three and four)) is 22.1 percentage points

³⁷ Petak/Bartlett/Bönker (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

³⁸ Haček/Pickel/Bönker (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

³⁹ Molina/Homs/César Colino (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.



higher than the OECD average. Within the 25 – 34 age cohort, 52.4 percent of the total population has attained their formal qualification in this education category.”⁴⁰

A principal result of the well-functioning vocational system, in the assessment of the SGI experts, is Germany’s very low rate of youth unemployment in international comparison. Unlike many other countries, Germany evinces only a relatively small mismatch between the qualifications of school, university and vocational education graduates and the needs of the labor market. This brings us to the next major dimension of the Social Justice Index – opportunities for labor market inclusion.

III Labor market access


The Europe 2020 strategy uses only the employment rate as a headline labor market indicator, treating this as a benchmark for successful labor market development and setting an employment rate of 75 percent as a target for the entire EU. By contrast, the current study draws on a number of additional important indicators that more fully reflect the concept of social justice. Among others, particular emphasis is given to indicators such as the national level of youth unemployment, the extent of long-term unemployment, in-work poverty, employment among older workers, and the ratio between employment rates for foreign-born and native residents.

A first cursory look at the aggregate ranking in this index category shows Austria, Denmark and Germany to hold a relatively clear lead, followed by the Nordic states of Finland and Sweden, as well as the Netherlands. Overall, these countries still have some of the lowest unemployment rates and the highest employment rates within the EU, even though the Scandinavian countries, like others, very clearly felt the effects of the crisis in their labor markets. For example, the unemployment rate in Denmark increased to 7.2 percent from just 3.5 percent in 2008. Unemployment increased during the crisis in Sweden and Finland too, although a slight positive trend has recently been evident. In addition, the individual countries in the top group show quite different strengths and weaknesses across the various indicators. While Sweden shows one of the highest overall employment rates in the EU, for example, sitting only slightly below the Europe 2020 headline indicator’s target of 75 percent, this northern European country’s high level of youth unemployment, at 23.5 percent (2013), has for years been a significant problem.

It is little surprise that Spain and Greece, each of which suffered considerably during the recent crisis years, fall clearly at the tail end of the rankings. Youth unemployment rates in both countries now stand well above 50 percent; given the lack of prospects for young people in these countries, this must be regarded as a lost generation. In addition, sometimes dramatically negative trends are also evident in Cyprus, Portugal, Italy and Croatia. Developments in France also deserve critical attention.

⁴⁰ Rüb/Ulbricht/Heinemann/Zohlnhöfer (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

Figure 15: Access to Labor Market



Source: Own calculations (Data used for constructing this composite indicator refer to the periods a: 2005-2008; b: 2008-2010; c: 2011-2013).

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By contrast, the strongest positive trend can be observed in Germany. Poland has also made significant improvements since 2008, although the country continues to rank only in the lower midrange of the comparison. Overall, however, the broad majority of countries have suffered a deterioration in labor market access opportunities as a result of the crisis. Only three of the 28 EU member states were able to show improvement as compared to the Social Justice Index 2008. This general negative trend has also been reflected in the development of the EU's headline indicator for the labor market. In recent years, no progress has been made toward the originally stated goal of bringing 75 percent of the population into employment. Indeed, the EU's average employment rate has even declined from 66 percent in 2008 to 63.5 percent in 2013.



In this context, it is especially noteworthy that Germany has proven able to improve more significantly than any other EU country. Yet even in this extraordinary success story, quite a few downsides from the perspective of social justice are evident. For these reasons, the example of Germany will be presented in somewhat greater detail in the following, if always in direct relation to the other EU countries' results. To begin, we examine the positive developments highlighted by the SGI country experts in their current report for Germany. In this regard, one of the main problems in the German labor market, at least until the implementation of the so-called Hartz

Figure 16: Unemployment Rate




Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013).

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reforms of 2003, was the high level of structural unemployment and, in particular, of long-term unemployment. The success in combating this structural unemployment has been quite impressive, especially when viewed in international comparison: In the years before and during the crisis, the country's employment rate steadily climbed, and unemployment – after a rather moderate increase in 2008 and a short period of stagnation in 2009 – has decreased.

Figure 17: Employment Rate



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013).

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The reduction of long-term unemployment in Germany in recent years represents a key positive trend, as long-term unemployment is one of the primary causes of poverty and social exclusion. Extended periods of exclusion from the labor market effectively preclude individuals from participating in society. In 2007, Germany was still among the worst performers with respect to this important indicator; now, with a long-term unemployment rate of 2.4 percent of the labor force (15 to 64 years), it has risen into the EU's upper ranks (6th place). At the same time, long-term unemployment in the crisis-battered southern European countries of Spain and Greece has risen

Figure 18: Long-term Unemployment Rate




Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013).

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to dramatic double-digit levels (see figure 18). In addition, the rate of unemployment among the comparatively low skilled in Germany has in recent years declined significantly, from 15.6 percent in 2008 to “only” 12.2 percent in 2013. Because it is above all low-skilled and otherwise hard-to-place people that are affected by long-term unemployment, labor market policies must focus on these population groups.

Figure 19: Older Employment Rate



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013).

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The development of older workers' labor-force integration has also contributed to Germany's overall very positive balance with regard to labor market policy outcomes. The employment rate among 55- to 64-year-olds in Germany has risen from 53.7 percent in 2008 to 63.5 percent (2013). However, the country remains significantly behind top-ranked Sweden, which shows a labor market integration rate among older people of 73.6 percent. The countries with the most catching up to do on this indicator are Slovenia, Greece, Malta and Croatia, all with rates of just over 30 percent.

Figure 20: Youth Unemployment Rate



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013).

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By contrast, Germany is the leader in the prevention of youth unemployment. The discrepancy between the three best-ranked countries of Germany, Austria and the Netherlands and the crisis-troubled countries of Italy, Portugal, Croatia, Spain and Greece is vast, and underscores the enormous justice-related shortcomings in the latter countries. The sometimes-negative labor market implications of austerity policies in the crisis countries will be discussed in greater detail below.

The so-called German job miracle has various sources: Along with the responsible conduct of the country's social partners (trade unions and employers) over the past few years, as well as the use of effective crisis-management instruments such as short-time working benefits, the various labor market reforms of the past decade have definitively taken effect. In addition, a broad range of active labor market policy instruments have been repeatedly adapted and evaluated. A number of these individually tailored measures are aimed in large part at the re-integration of the long-term unemployed into the labor market. Overall, the reforms of past years have significantly increased the flexibility and absorptive capacity of the German labor market. However, while these developments are positive from the point of view of rising employment figures, they also have a negative side. Particularly noteworthy here is the development of a dual labor market with classic regular employment relationships on the one hand, and a rising incidence of atypical employment with insufficient vertical permeability (low-wage sector, marginal employment, temporary contracts) on the other.⁴¹ The agreement by the new Grand Coalition on a nationwide statutory minimum wage of €8.50 to be instituted by 2017 at the latest accordingly represents a meaningful corrective step and should lead to a greater degree of social justice. In fact, a look at the in-work poverty indicator rankings shows that Germany still has need of improvement in this area, as about 5.7 percent of all individuals in full-time employment are at risk of poverty. In Finland, by contrast, this figure is only 2.7 percent.

Further shortcomings from the perspective of social justice are evident when comparing the ratios of labor-force integration for women and men, as well as in the indicator comparing employment rates between native- and foreign-born individuals. While in Finland, Lithuania and Sweden employment rates for women are nearly as high as those for men, Germany falls only into the midrange in this regard. The same applies to the ratio between employment rates for native-born and foreign-born workers. Here, Ireland and Estonia show a nearly balanced ratio between the two groups of workers. Germany, by contrast, ranks only at 17th place. Despite an overall positive labor market performance, the Netherlands and Sweden also display significant weaknesses in terms of integrating migrants into the labor market (more on this below). Countries such as Denmark and France also fall into the lower ranks of the comparison on this measure.

⁴¹ Rütz/Ubricht/Heinemann/Zohlnhöfer (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.



Finally, the considerable variance across EU member states with regard to involuntarily temporary employment is notable. In top-ranked Austria, only 8.1 percent of temporary employees surveyed responded that they had taken temporary work because they could not obtain a permanent contract. Germany follows at 2nd place, but with the rate already at 21.2 percent. By contrast, in Spain and Cyprus, more than 90 percent of people with temporary work are in this position involuntarily.


Figure 21: In-work Poverty Rate



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012, 2013).

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Figure 22: Main Reason for Temporary Employment: Couldn't Get Permanent Job



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013).

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Overall, EU members such as Austria and Germany, as well as the northern European countries of Denmark, Finland and Sweden, can be found near the top of the overall rankings for the labor market inclusion dimension, and in the course of the last several decades have generally developed relatively stable and constructive social-partnership structures. The SGI country experts for Austria – in a manner similar to that of the Germany country experts – emphasize this as a critical element in the success of the Austrian model: “One factor contributing to Austria’s rather successful labor market outcomes is the social partnership between the Austrian Trade Union Federation (Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, ÖGB) and the Austrian Economic Chambers.



Many labor market policies in Austria are effectuated through the Public Employment Service, another institution key to the country's employment successes. The Austrian dual system of vocational education, in which young people receive on-the-job vocational training while still attending school, has also been successful, and is increasingly drawing international attention.⁴² The country experts' reference to the well-functioning dual vocational training system also applies to Germany, as outlined above. Some countries with high rates of youth unemployment see in this system a possible starting point for such reforms in their own domestic markets.

Interestingly, this also applies to Sweden, as the SGI country experts explicitly note in their latest report: "The continuing EU integration and mobility of labor has triggered a new set of issues related to the domestic regulations in the market. Also, there has been extensive debate about introducing an apprentice model to help youth make the transition from education to the labor market. Additionally, Swedish policymakers have been trying to create a short-time work scheme for public employees, as exists in Germany. These examples may indicate that the old Swedish model of labor market policy is gradually moving toward the German model."⁴³

At the same time, the Sweden experts point out problematic tendencies toward an increasingly dual labor market, as well as various other justice-related shortcomings: "As in other European countries, in Sweden a dualization of the labor market is taking place, albeit at a slower speed than, for example, in Germany. Whether related to culture or differences in training and work experience, immigrants to Sweden have severe problems successfully entering into the labor market. Sweden shares this problem with a large number of countries but it has proven to be exceptionally inept at this aspect of integration. The large number of unemployed immigrants erodes integration policies to a great extent and will be a major challenge for policymakers in the future. During the financial crisis, however, the Swedish government relied on active labor market policies. In this respect, the old pattern of crisis management was in use. Nevertheless, the efficiency of active labor market policies is highly contested, especially given the high unemployment rates and the high youth and immigrant unemployment rates."⁴⁴

The country experts' analyses of problems in the Netherlands and Finland are very similar in many respects, despite both countries' overall good performance in EU comparison. While in Finland, the comparatively high level of youth unemployment and the increasing incidence of temporary work contracts figure as core challenges with respect to social justice in the labor market, the country experts for the Netherlands summarize the problem areas there as follows: "There are some weak spots: relatively low labor market participation of migrants; little transition from unemployment to new jobs; relatively few actual working hours; a growing dual labor market between insiders (with high job security) and outsiders (with low to no job security); relatively high levels of discrimination on-the-job; and high work pressure."⁴⁵

⁴² Pelinka/Winter-Ebmer/Zohlnhöfer (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁴³ Pierre/Jochem/Jahn (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Hoppe/Woldendorp/Bandelow (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

And finally, a look at the overall second-placed Denmark shows that the “flexicurity” approach followed there, which has served as inspiration for similar reform debates in other countries, was unable to prevent a fairly significant increase in unemployment rates during the crisis. Nevertheless, the country experts assess a cautiously positive balance with regard to the flexicurity model, as no continuing and entrenched negative trend has subsequently emerged in the labor market: “With the current economic crisis, the model faces challenges. A major challenge is to ensure that an increase in unemployment does not translate into an increase in structural unemployment. It is still too early to judge whether this will be the case, but several indicators suggest that the labor market has displayed substantial flexibility in coping with the crisis. First, wages have adapted to the new situation, and the deterioration in wage competition in the boom period prior to the crisis has to a large extent been eliminated. Second, although there has been some increase in long-term unemployment, the increase has not been as large as in previous crises, and there does not seem to be a trend increase in long-term unemployment. Finally, the high level of job turnover remains in place, implying that most unemployment spells are short, and that entry into the labor market is reasonably easy for the young. Youth unemployment has increased but it is still among the lowest in the OECD area. The current government has continued the active labor market policy of previous governments, with emphasis on improving competitiveness. In 2012, the budgeted amount for labor market policy was approximately DKK 16 billion, almost 0.9 percent of GDP, much higher than most OECD countries.”⁴⁶

Of course, the crisis-stricken countries of southern Europe in particular can only dream of having the investment flexibility to enable this degree of support for active labor market policies. The drastic austerity policies there have led to massive financial cuts in nearly all policy areas. In most of these countries, the governments have introduced rigorous structural reforms intended to increase the flexibility of labor markets. In this regard, the SGI country experts’ detailed analysis of the downright dramatic labor market situation in Greece results in a clearly negative conclusion, at least with respect to the short-term and immediate effects of austerity and the associated constraints on labor market restructuring: “In sum, the terms of the bailout have increased unemployment and disabled government policies for helping people into work. At best, this is a flexibilization of the labor market that will reduce costs and increase competitiveness, allowing a more sustainable economic path in the future. But in the short- and medium term, such austerity simply increases unemployment dramatically.”⁴⁷

Likewise, in similarly badly affected Spain, severe structural reforms have been implemented. In the most recent SGI survey period, from 2011 to 2013, the number of unemployed people even rose to 26.2 percent (2013). The country experts emphasize in this regard that “unemployment particularly affects low-skill occupations, immigrants, women and young people. There is also a severe mismatch between workers’ qualifications and job availability, with many highly skilled

⁴⁶ Laursen/Andersen/Jahn (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁴⁷ Sotiropoulos/Featherstone/Karadag (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.



employees not making adequate use of their expertise and capabilities.”⁴⁸ The development of a dual labor market is particularly extreme in Spain, as “an enormous 35 percent of the workforce serves under temporary contracts and has no job protection, in contrast to the overprotected 65 percent”.⁴⁹

To be sure, the reform measures implemented in 2012 by the Popular Party (Partido Popular, PP) government cover a broad spectrum, with the aim of increasing the competitiveness and permeability of the sclerotic Spanish labor market. This has included “measures such as reinforcing the temporary job companies as employment agencies; fostering the training contract and the extension of the eligible age (up to 30); introducing new permanent contracts to SMEs with fiscal benefits; creating bonuses for hiring groups especially affected, such as young and older people; imposing restrictions on the succession of temporary contracts and modification of the part-time contract; introducing the possibility of modifying the functions of employees, as well as their workday and salary; prioritizing the enterprise agreement over the collective with the aim of moderating wages, etc.”⁵⁰ However, only with the findings of the next survey round will it become evident whether these measures have been successful in the medium term. There are signs that the worst is over as the unemployment rate has declined in the first quarter of 2014. However, from the perspective of social justice, the current situation is still distressing, as the lack of prospects particularly for the younger generation represents a heavy burden for social cohesion in the country. Fortunately, this situation has not yet been reflected in a strengthening of radical parties, as has taken place in Greece. Overall, the data discussed here clearly demonstrate the magnitude of the differences in terms of the realization of justice in labor markets across the EU. The need for government action is immense if a reduction in the social divide between northern and southern Europe is to be achieved – not to mention the achievement of an overall employment level of 75 percent.

IV Social cohesion and non-discrimination

To what extent is social policy successful in generating equal opportunities and in averting social polarization and isolation? How strong is the polarization of income within a country? How effectively does the state protect against discrimination based on factors such as gender, physical ability, ethnic origin, social status, political views or religion? To what degree do policies promote the integration of migrants into society? These issues are captured by the social cohesion and non-discrimination dimension.

In the overall ranking for this dimension, Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, Luxembourg and Germany are quite clearly leaders, each with more than seven points. Sweden even scores slightly above eight points, the only EU country to do so. By contrast, Cyprus, Italy, Hungary,


⁴⁸ Molina/Homs/Colino (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Greece, constituting the lowest-end group, each fail to reach the five-point mark. Moreover, a strong negative trend has been evident in recent years particularly in the southern European countries of Greece and Spain, further widening the divide between these countries and those at the top of the rankings – a worrisome development from the perspective of social justice. On the other hand, Poland has shown an encouraging upward trend, improving more significantly than any other EU country.

Figure 23: Social Cohesion and Non-discrimination



Source: Own calculations (Data used for constructing this composite indicator refer to the periods a: 2005-2007; b: 2008-2010; c: 2011-2013).

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How do the results in the various indicators of this dimension look? With regard to the SGI experts' assessments of social inclusion policy, the Nordic countries as well as the Netherlands and Luxembourg receive the best overall ratings in cross-EU comparison. In general, the small and homogeneous northern European states have relatively egalitarian societies. Values of equality, integration and community are deeply rooted in the Nordic countries' societies, and even though there are public debates about growing societal heterogeneity, these long-standing values continue to prevail in politics and in society. The country experts for Denmark, for example, emphasize in their report that "Denmark has traditionally been known for having a high degree of social cohesion and the country is fairly egalitarian. High taxes allow for generous transfers to less well-off citizens translating into few instances of absolute poverty in Denmark. Welfare programs also have strong legitimacy. A high percentage of people are said to be happy with their life".⁵¹ Nevertheless, as the country experts demonstrate by means of various statistical data, these countries too show evidence of certain problems and negative developments. In this regard, it is striking that it is no longer a Scandinavian country that today shows the lowest level of income polarization, but rather Slovenia. Denmark, which had previously always been among the best-ranked countries with regard to income distribution, has seen the most significant deterioration among the northern European countries in this area. This country is now ranked at 12th place EU-wide on the basis of its Gini coefficient, only just ahead of Germany, which has improved in recent years. Even in Sweden, which still sits at 3rd place by this measure, some - if only slight - deterioration has been evident over the last five years.⁵²

While Poland has certainly been able to improve in the area of income polarization, under the Tusk government it has also shown an upward trend with regard to social inclusion and non-discrimination overall: "The Tusk government has been successful in mitigating regional disparities through successful regional development policies, in improving the financial situation of families, especially those suffering from poverty, and in increasing educational attainment and in reducing unemployment. However, labor market participation has remained low, and unemployment has risen in the period under review."⁵³


The greatest disparity in income distribution within the EU is currently found in Latvia, as well as in the southern European countries of Greece, Portugal and Spain. However, the United Kingdom, Romania and Bulgaria also figure among the countries with a relatively high degree of income polarization.

⁵¹ Laursen/Andersen/Jahn (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁵² Pierre/Jochem/Jahn (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁵³ Matthes/Markowski/Bönker (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

Figure 24: Gini Coefficient



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012, 2013).

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As stated in the introduction of this report, effective prevention of discrimination in society is one of the central principles in ensuring equality of opportunity. In advancing the equality of opportunity, social background, which can include membership in a particular social group, are not allowed to negatively affect personal life planning. Though most EU countries have enacted legislation against discrimination, it persists to different extents against, for example, ethnic minorities, women, homosexuals and religious minorities.



All in all, the SGI experts identify good or at least acceptable anti-discrimination policies in most EU states. At the head of the group are Ireland, Sweden and the Netherlands. For Ireland, the country experts emphasize the efficacy of strict anti-discrimination laws, pointing favorably to the so-called Equality Authority. This “is an independent body set up under the Employment Equality Act, 1998 to monitor discrimination. An independent equality tribunal was established under the same act to offer an accessible and impartial forum to remedy unlawful discrimination. These agencies have been active in recent years and successful in prosecuting cases on behalf of parties who felt they had been discriminated against”.⁵⁴

In Sweden’s case too, the experts note that the country “still ranks as one of the most egalitarian societies in the world. Discrimination based on any feature, be it gender, race, sexual preferences or ethnicity, is not tolerated. That said, it is clear that there are still differences between salaries for men and women doing the same job, and between immigrants and Swedes in the labor market. These are spheres of society where public regulation is only effective when complaints are filed with public authorities. There are two ombudsmen dealing exclusively with discrimination issues; one for gender issues and one for other forms of discrimination”.⁵⁵ The fact that Sweden is also the top-ranked country with regard to the share of female parliamentary representatives corresponds to the country’s overall positive results for the anti-discrimination indicator. From the perspective of gender-related justice, there should be no imbalance in access to political offices, at least to the greatest extent possible. In Sweden, more than 44 percent of parliamentary members are women. This is the best such figure in the EU and the OECD. The other Nordic states of Finland and Denmark follow in second and third place.

By contrast, Hungary shows the greatest imbalance between the genders in its parliament. Here, more than 90 percent of parliamentary representatives are men, and there is no sign that the trend is beginning to change. More generally, it is evident that many EU states can and should improve greatly with regard to this indicator. The fact that still only 22 percent of parliamentary members in the United Kingdom are women, for example, should be cause for sober reflection.


Overall, Croatia, Hungary, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Greece show the most significant deficiencies in the EU with respect to protection from discrimination. In these countries, minority elements occasionally face systematic discrimination. In the case of Croatia, the country experts are critical of the fact that “in particular, the Roma encounter discrimination in almost all areas of life and especially in education and employment. Also, although Croatia has a good legal framework governing minority rights, Croatian citizens of Serbian ethnicity continue to experience discrimination. According to the ombudsman’s office, the most frequent discrimination is based on ethnicity (31% of cases). It is followed by discrimination based on gender, social status, origin and disability”.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Walsh/Mitchell/Bandelow (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁵⁵ Pierre/Jochem/Jahn (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁵⁶ Petak/Bartlett/Bönker (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

Figure 25: Non-discrimination (SGI)



Source: Own calculations (data from a: SGI 2009; b: SGI 2011; c: SGI 2014).

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The serious problem of discrimination against the Roma minority is also clearly evident in Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. Although a new strategy aimed at combating discrimination against the Roma was adopted in Hungary in 2011, the SGI country experts testify to the continuing presence of considerable discrimination: “According to estimates, about half of all Roma children in Hungary are still segregated from other pupils and receive substandard education. In many cases, court rulings against segregation are not enforced. Other groups have suffered from discrimination as well. The growing anti-Semitism in Hungary led the World Jewish Congress to convene its



2013 annual congress in Budapest.”⁵⁷ In addition to discrimination against the Roma, Romania shows evidence of tension between the Hungarian minority and Romanians: “The ethnic Hungarian community still expresses concerns about linguistic and education rights. In February 2013 tensions between Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania escalated when Romanian officials banned the Székely flag from the roofs of office buildings.”⁵⁸

In Greece, the country experts again cite an increase in racially motivated violent acts: “In the period under review the Greek state was unable to contain, let alone roll back, the outbursts of racial violence which periodically spread through neighborhoods of Athens with a high concentration of migrants from South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.”⁵⁹

Non-discrimination is also closely linked to the policy field of integration. In this regard, the Justice Index particularly draws on the qualitative assessments provided by SGI experts. In many EU countries, a considerable portion of the population is made up of immigrants, who must be given a genuine opportunity to participate in society. Among the EU countries, the Netherlands, Finland, Luxembourg and Germany perform best overall with regard to immigration and integration policies.

However, even in these countries, the SGI country experts note several fundamental problems that demand increased attention on the part of policymakers if social justice is to be expanded in scope and reach. Though these countries, which place near the top of current studies and rankings on migration and integration, have benefitted from the legislative and regulatory measures in this policy field, they nonetheless grapple with problems found in other countries as well. For example, in the case of Finland, the country experts in the current SGI report criticize the fact that “second-generation immigrants have had difficulties finding education or work, and the employment situation when comparing overall foreign-born employment, or foreign-born to native-born employment, or even foreign-born generational concerns, is certainly troubled. Increasing the labor market participation rate is one of the key targets of the government’s Future of Migration 2020 Strategy.”⁶⁰

In Germany, which has a completely different population structure and around 16 times more inhabitants than Finland, immigration and integration policy has made significant progress in recent years. Yet major challenges persist here as well. The overall migration balance has recently been positive, and particularly for EU citizens and highly skilled migrants, barriers to immigration to Germany have become comparatively low. “As a consequence of its good labor market performance and the deep crisis in the European south, Germany has again become an attractive destination for migrants.”⁶¹ For integration to succeed, however, equal opportunities for societal participation are crucial. Participation opportunities for people with a migration background, for

⁵⁷ Agh/Dieringer/Bönker (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁵⁸ Wagner/Pop-Eleches/Bönker (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁵⁹ Sotiropoulos/Featherstone/Karadag (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁶⁰ Anckar/Kuitto/Oberst/Jahn (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁶¹ Rüb/Ulbricht/Heinemann/Zohnhöfer (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

example in access to education and work, remain in some respects below average in cross-OECD and cross-EU comparisons. “The problems are being addressed through the education system, as for instance through early German-language teaching in child-care facilities, but this cannot yet be deemed a clear success story.”⁶² Naturalization rates are also relatively low: “In 2011, 106,900 people acquired German citizenship, representing a naturalization rate of just 1.44% of the country’s immigrants annually.”⁶³

The Netherlands achieved a very good fifth place in the last Migrant Integration Policy Index, which compares 31 industrial countries. Yet here too, the SGI experts see continuing weaknesses in a few areas: “Since 2008 – 2009 all non-EU nationals who immigrate to the Netherlands are required to learn the Dutch language and develop knowledge about Dutch society. The Civic Integration Abroad policy requires obligatory integration tests in the country of origin for family reunion applicants. However, Human Rights Watch stated that this poses some concerns because it clearly applies only to family migrants from certain nationalities, mainly from non-Western countries. The number of applications decreased and further financial restrictions (€350 for each time the test is taken) infringed upon the right to family life. After one family applicant successfully brought a case before the European Court of Justice in March 2010, family reunion policy became more clear and coherent. Compared to other countries, immigrants benefit from several measures targeting employment security and labor market integration. In terms of political participation, the Netherlands performs very well on immigrants’ political liberties in forming associations and political parties. Nonetheless, applicants for national citizenship can be rejected for not participating in the mandatory Naturalization Day ceremony. The Rutte-Asscher government intends to criminalize illegal residence in order to speed up the re-emigration process to the country of origin.”⁶⁴

It is interesting to note that Sweden and Denmark, which achieve high ratings on almost every indicator in the Social Justice Index’s social cohesion and non-discrimination dimension, are not in the top group in terms of integration policy. Although massive social exclusion is still relatively rare in Sweden, problems associated with the integration of non-Swedish citizens are matters of intense public discussion. According to the SGI country experts, “it is difficult to argue that integration policy in Sweden has been successful. In terms of both educational attainment and employment, immigrants in Sweden find it much more difficult to integrate than immigrants in comparable countries. This is not to say that there is a lack of political or economic commitment to integration policy. To the contrary, integration policy remains a very important policy sector and related political activities are far reaching. The activities of the ombudsman and the minister for immigration and equality ensure that immigration issues have a high public salience. Sweden’s lack of success in integrating immigrants, despite strong efforts, suggests that the problem lies in the design and implementation of its integration policies. It is possible that the same obstacles

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Hoppe/Woldendorp/Bandelow (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.



facing young people as they try to make their way into the labor market also discriminates against immigrants. There is some good news, however. Studies show that second-generation immigrants, particularly girls, perform well in secondary and tertiary education. However, for immigrants with low education entry into a labor market with high standards seems more or less blocked”.⁶⁵

The same applies for Denmark, where non-Western immigrants, for instance, face higher unemployment rates and lower educational achievements. However, the country experts note a recent, positive approach on the part of the government aimed at supporting the integration of migrants. “The government, in cooperation with municipalities, has therefore introduced a number of policies and measures designed to further the integration of immigrants. These instruments, apart from language courses at all levels, include financial incentives to municipalities, businesses, NGOs and so on that assist with the integration of immigrants. Since these reforms have gone into effect there have been improvements. Indeed, an increasing number of immigrants say they feel more integrated and have more Danish friends, and fewer say they experience discrimination. In addition, many more immigrants speak Danish than ever before. The political rhetoric has also changed somewhat after the Social-Democratic-led government came to power in October 2011. Still, there is a long way to go.”⁶⁶

France too faces significant challenges in this area, as the country experts emphasize in their most recent report: “The integration of the so-called second (in fact, often the third) generation of immigrants, especially coming from Maghreb countries, is difficult for many reasons: education system failures; community concentration in urban/suburban ghettos; high unemployment; cultural identity issues, and so on. Add to this the challenges of illegal immigrants, many of whom moved to France more than 10 or 15 years ago yet have no regular job and do not contribute to the pension system. Although they can access health care and their children can attend schools, the situation is often dramatic and inextricable as for many, it is impossible to fulfill the requirements for a residence permit. Immigrants must demonstrate that they have the required documents, such as tax records, employment contracts and housing contracts, while at the same time they are essentially forced into the labor and housing black market, as potential employers and landlords will not document that they employ or house illegal aliens, as this is a crime. Under such conditions, integration is difficult, if not impossible.”⁶⁷

Croatia, Malta, Slovenia, Cyprus and Bulgaria receive the lowest scores in cross-EU comparison with respect to integration policy. According to the most recent SGI report, Malta as yet has no “formal integration policy, and although it grants refugee status to immigrants coming from vulnerable states in line with international obligations, it has not addressed the integration of these and other immigrants into Maltese society”.⁶⁸ Various international studies have recently

⁶⁵ Pierre/Jochem/Jahn (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁶⁶ Laursen/Andersen/Jahn (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁶⁷ Mény/Utterwedde/Zohlnhöfer (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁶⁸ Pirota/Calleja/Colino (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

concluded that “it was extremely difficult for migrants who moved out of migrant centers to integrate into communities in the hope of finding gainful employment to re-enter the same open center system if they subsequently lost their source of income. Migrants granted subsidiary or humanitarian protections are not eligible for unemployment benefits, and as a result, migrants wanting to seek work and their own accommodation think twice before doing so. If a migrant loses his job, they end up not only jobless but homeless and with no social safety net”.⁶⁹

Croatia, by contrast, faces a different problem, which also remains as yet without a successful solution: “The treatment of returnees from among the 200,000 Croat citizens of Serbian ethnicity expelled from the country in 1995 represents a significant gap in migration policy. Nearly 21,500 minority returnees still have outstanding housing, reconstruction and civil-status issues to resolve, with most returnee families needing legal counseling to help them gain access to their basic rights. Many refugees have not been able to return to Croatia as they were stripped of their rights to socially owned housing after the war.”⁷⁰

Finally, the so-called NEET indicator also influences overall ratings in the social cohesion and non-discrimination index category. This indicator provides information on how many people between the ages of 20 and 24 are neither currently employed nor taking part in any form of education or training program. It is striking that – with the exception of Malta – the countries receiving the best ratings on this indicator also hold the leading places in the index category’s overall rankings. NEET rates in Luxembourg and the Netherlands are particularly low; by contrast, they are high in Greece and Italy, where more than 30 percent of people between the ages of 20 and 24 are neither in employment or participating in training or further-education programs. For these people opportunities for societal participation are significantly impaired. The very significant negative trend in the southern European countries is particularly worrisome. In Greece, the NEET rate nearly doubled between 2008 and 2013. In Italy, it has climbed by ten percentage points in the last five years. In all, only three countries were able to improve during the period reviewed, including Germany, which showed a gain of more than three percentage points.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Petak/Bartlett/Bönker (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.



Figure 26: NEET Rate




Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013).

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V Health

In the health dimension, Sweden, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium hold the top four places, each with around eight points. The midfield ranges from rank 12 (Spain) to rank 20 (Portugal), whereas Latvia and Romania fall clearly at the last two places, each with under four points. The largest deterioration can be seen in the case of Greece, which has slipped more than a full point relative to the previous survey.

Figure 27: Health



Source: Own calculations (Data used for constructing this composite indicator refer to the periods a: 2005-2008; b: 2008-2010; c: 2011-2013).

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According to the qualitative assessments of SGI experts, the majority of the EU countries' health systems can, in principle, be considered inclusive. However, there are clear differences in terms of the quality of health services, as well as variations in ease of access depending on the quality and type of health service. Even among the ranking's top group we see variations, for instance, with regard to waiting times. In Sweden, for example, the SGI country experts point out that "concerning inclusiveness, eligibility to health care is generously defined in Sweden. Instead, the big problem is the waiting time from diagnosis to treatment. The national government has introduced



a “care guarantee,” (“vårdgaranti”) which entitles a patient to treatment within 90 days after first seeing a general practitioner. Evaluations suggest that the guarantee has somewhat improved the situation but also that a large number of patients still have to wait beyond the stipulated 90 days for treatment”.⁷¹

In contrast, long waiting times are not a problem in Luxembourg. Here, the country experts instead identify the fact that the country lacks its own university-based hospital as a key factor. However, other hospitals offer medical services and a wide range of treatments at a very high level of quality. With regard to equitable access to health care services, within Luxembourg’s health insurance system “the same tariff structures exist for all doctors and patients (including for the three independent insurance programs). [However], access to treatment under the Luxembourg health care system is limited to contributors (employees, employers and their co-insured family members) only. It excludes newcomers without a work contract or those who do not have another form of voluntary insurance coverage. Applicants for international protection are insured via the competent ministry. Furthermore, Luxembourg’s national insurer offers generous reimbursements; out-of-pocket expenses for patients in Luxembourg are the lowest within the OECD”.⁷²

In Denmark, the universal, tax-financed health care system performs particularly well with regard to inclusiveness, functioning according to the following fundamental principles: “universal health care for all citizens, regardless of economic circumstances; services are offered ‘free of charge’”.⁷³ However, the country experts here also note the problem of long waiting lists and a general trend toward a more strongly demand-driven system. This development is expressed, for example, in the current “time guarantee” for patients, “where patients under the public system can turn to a private provider if the public health care system can’t meet the time limit for treatment in a public hospital. In addition, the government has aimed to bring more private providers into the sector”.⁷⁴ Moreover, in the United Kingdom, the National Health Service (NHS) performs very well from the point of view of fair access opportunities, and can indeed be regarded as a cornerstone of the British welfare state. The country experts emphasize in this context that “most health care provided by the NHS is free at the point of delivery, although there are charges for prescriptions and for dental treatment (with significant exceptions, e.g., no charges for prescriptions for pensioners)”.⁷⁵

In Germany’s case, the quality of medical services is extremely high in international comparison. Moreover, since 2009 there has been a general, statutory obligation to have health insurance, leading today to near-complete coverage for the entire population. Accordingly, government policy in recent years has focused less on questions of ensuring the health care system’s quality and inclusiveness, and more on issues of cost efficiency and affordability. However, with regard to the

⁷¹ Pierre/Jochem/Jahn (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁷² Hartmann-Hirsch/Schneider/Lorig/Bandelow (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.


⁷³ Laursen/Andersen/Jahn (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Busch/Begg/Bandelow (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

issue of equitable conditions for access, the SGI country experts do note that “the system does contain certain inequalities in terms of access. While patients with private insurance coverage get fast access to all kinds of diagnostic tests and specialized doctors, patients with coverage from the statutory health insurance plans face somewhat longer waiting times and the potential for a rise in copayments. As a consequence, some observers have proposed creating a fully integrated insurance system”.⁷⁶

Figure 28: Health Systems’ Outcomes (based on EHCI)



Source: Euro Health Consumer Index (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2009; c: 2013).

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⁷⁶ Rütj/Ulbricht/Heinemann/Zohlnhöfer (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.



Whereas health care in the top-ranked countries is both inclusive and generally of very high quality, the degree of quality and inclusiveness varies greatly in several other countries. In considering the lowest-ranked countries, for example, this becomes very clear. In the case of second to last-place Romania, country experts conclude that “the quality and equity of Romania’s public health system has been undermined by inadequate funding: Romania has the lowest health budget allocation of all EU member states. Since 2002, the healthcare budget fluctuated around 3.5% to 4% of GDP, though this share has increased marginally to 4.2% in 2013. Due largely to this underfunding, the de facto availability of many medical services is severely limited, thereby leading to widespread bribe-giving by patients even for basic services. Moreover, for many specialized procedures patients have to resort to private providers, which offer higher quality services but are often quite expensive, thereby leading to significant inequities in medical care access”.⁷⁷

Latvia too faces significant challenges in achieving a qualitatively highly rated and equitable health care system. According to the SGI country experts, “health outcomes for Latvia continue to lag behind those of most EU countries, and dissatisfaction with the system remains high. (...) Residents have free access to a family physician, who approves state-paid further treatment. This system results in long queues. Health care benefits are available at state- and municipality-owned institutions, as well as private inpatient and outpatient facilities. The large copayment required for services presents barriers to lower-income groups (...)”.⁷⁸

In Greece, the sweeping austerity measures have affected the health system too, in some cases leading to significant problems: “Social insurance funds delayed payments to pharmacies. The latter used to deliver medicines to insured patients over the counter and then obtain payment by submitting receipts to the patients’ social insurance funds. However, these funds saw their finances deteriorate as they depended heavily on the state budget. (...) Similar trends occurred in the finances of public hospitals, which also depended on social insurance funds for health care costs incurred by insured patients. Payments to hospitals came in arrears, while the Ministry of Health’s budget was itself subjected to cuts. Eventually, at various time periods in 2011 – 2013 suppliers of necessary goods and services to public hospitals delayed or completely refrained from making deliveries to such organizations. Additionally, the motivation of doctors serving in public hospitals suffered from wage cuts imposed across the public sector.”⁷⁹ Nevertheless, the experts note with regard to the 2011– 2013 review period that “even though public health care was in crisis, no patient was refused treatment in Greek hospitals, including non-citizens who had never paid any social insurance contributions, such as the migrants from South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet the fact remains that health care policy only partly achieved the three criteria, namely quality, inclusiveness and cost efficiency”.⁸⁰ The data provided by Eurostat on self-reported unmet need for medical help reveal what percent of respondents did not receive the appropriate medical


⁷⁷ Wagner/Pop-Eleches/Bönker (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁷⁸ Terauda/Reetz/Jahn (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁷⁹ Sotiropoulos/Featherstone/Karadag (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

Figure 29: Accessibility and Range (based on EHCI)



Source: Euro Health Consumer Index (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2009; c: 2013).

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care because it was either too expensive, too far to travel or there was a waiting list. The health care systems of Slovenia (0.1%), Austria (0.3%) and the Netherlands (0.5%) perform best in this category, while more than every tenth Romanian (10.7%) and Latvian (12.3%) was, according to the survey, unable to access treatment.

⁸¹ Cf. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/en/tsdph100_esmsip.htm.



A consideration of the performance of EU countries' health care systems with regard to the outcome indicators "healthy life years" and "infant mortality," reveals that the majority of EU countries lie quite closely together. But here too are outliers at both the top and bottom: Infant mortality rates are lowest in Slovenia, Finland, Luxembourg, the Czech Republic and Sweden. These countries' statistics reveal just 1.6 to 2.6 deaths per thousand births. The large majority of EU countries have a mortality rate between three and five cases per thousand. Only Latvia (6.3), Malta (6.3), Bulgaria (7.8) and Romania (9.0) show clearly worse values, although in all of these countries, infant mortality rates have trended significantly downward in recent years.


Figure 30: Self-reported Unmet Needs for Medical Help



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2011, 2012).

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Figure 31: Infant Mortality Rate



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012).

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In looking at the indicator on healthy life years somewhat more closely, similar patterns emerge from the distribution. According to Eurostat, the indicator on healthy life years (HLY) measures the number of remaining years that a person of specific age is expected to live without any severe or moderate health problems. The notion of health problem for Eurostat's HLY is reflecting a disability dimension and is based on a self-perceived question which aims to measure the extent of any limitations, for at least six months, because of a health problem that may have affected respondents as regards activities they usually do (the so-called GALI - Global Activity Limitation




Instrument foreseen in the annual EU-SILC survey). The indicator is therefore also called disability-free life expectancy (DFLE), and demonstrates in international comparison the extent to which opportunities for societal participation may be constrained not only through structural injustices in each EU country's health care system, but also as a result of personal states of health.⁸¹

The findings for this indicator are interesting: While Sweden and Malta are the only two countries in the European Union in which the population averages over 70 healthy life years, Slovakia and Estonia perform the most poorly in this regard. With a respective 53 and 55 healthy life years, both fall well under the EU average (61.9 years). The below-average performance here of Germany is surprising; despite its qualitatively very highly rated health system, it scores more poorly than Romania, showing an average expectation of just 57.7 healthy life years. The indicator may thus reveal the fact that the average state of health in a country is not only a question of the performance and the equity of the national health care system, but also has to do with people's personal lifestyles and healthy or unhealthy behaviors. In line with this, the country experts for Denmark note that while the number of smokers in the country has markedly decreased in recent years, the problem of obesity has increased significantly. In this context, the Danish SGI country experts also write that "the social gradient in health remains strong".⁸² At the same time, the quality and performance level of the Danish health care system – as in Germany – are nevertheless extremely high.

⁸² Laursen/Andersen/Jahn (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁸³ Pierre/Jochem/Jahn (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

Figure 32: Healthy Life Expectancy



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012).

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
VI Intergenerational justice

A fair distribution of opportunities and resources across generations is a fundamental element of social justice. The concept of intergenerational justice is here comprised of three distinct components. First, expert assessments of family and pension policies are used, in order to evaluate political measures aimed at both younger and older generations. The dependency ratio is used as an additional indicator, with the aim of depicting the problem posed to a society by demographic



pressures. Environmental policy, the second component, is assessed by using a qualitative indicator and an international comparison of greenhouse gas emissions per capita, as well as the share of renewable energy of the total primary energy consumption of a given country. The third component involves assessing the political-economic conditions being established for future generations by measuring investment in research and development and the level of debt contained in the public budget.

Figure 33: Intergenerational Justice



Source: Own calculations (Data used for constructing this composite indicator refer to the periods a: 2005-2008; b: 2008-2010; c: 2011-2013).

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Overall, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Estonia perform best in terms of intergenerational justice according to the criteria used here. This is due in part to their very good ratings on family, pension and environmental policies, as we will see below. By contrast, Greece, Italy and Cyprus display the greatest weaknesses, with particularly negative ratings in the areas of fiscal, environmental and pension policies.

A policy oriented to generational justice keeps families and senior citizens alike in focus and seeks a balance between the interests of the young and old. The Scandinavian states attain top ratings in the categories of both family and pension policy. Child-friendly policies have always been a hallmark of the Scandinavian approach. With regard to Sweden, the country experts write in their current SGI report that the country “has been politically and economically committed to strong family policy for the past 50 years. Major features of Sweden’s policy have been the separation of spouses’ income and individual taxation, the expansion of public and private day care centers and a very generous parental leave program provided to both women and men, which has created much better possibilities to combine a professional career with parenthood”.⁸³ The assessments of the SGI’s Denmark experts show a similar orientation: “The country’s system of day care centers, preschools and kindergartens allow sufficient flexibility for both parents to work. Indeed, female employment in Denmark is among the highest in OECD countries. Comparative research also shows that men in Nordic countries do more household work than men in many other countries. The system of parental leave, in connection with childbirth, is relatively generous and men also have parental leave rights. (...) There is a user payment (means tested) for day care, but the system is tax subsidized. Danes regard day care and preschool facilities as an indispensable public service. There has been a large increase in the number of preschools in recent years.”⁸⁴

In addition to their exemplary family policies, the Danish, Finnish and Swedish pension reforms of the 1990s and 2000s can also be viewed as promising from the point of view of financial sustainability and intergenerational justice. Denmark, according to the SGI experts, is exemplary in this regard: “The financial consequences of increasing longevity are large, and have been at the core of policy debates for some years. A so-called welfare reform was approved with broad parliamentary support in 2006. This scheme increases the statutory age for early retirement by two years over the period 2019–2023, and the statutory pension age by two years over the period 2024–2027. After these transitions periods, the statutory ages are linked to longevity via an indexation mechanism targeting an average retirement period of 19.5 years. This reform is a significant response to the challenge of Denmark’s aging population, and in combination with other recent reforms, will ensure the sustainability of its public finances.”⁸⁵ Given the enormous demographic challenges associated with societal aging, the fundamental reforms made by governments in Sweden and Finland with the aim of securing their pension systems are of considerable importance. Next to Italy, Germany and Greece, Sweden is the “oldest” country in the European Union. It is thus all the

⁸⁴ Laursen/Andersen/Jahn (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.


⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Cotta/Maruhn/Colino (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.



more notable that despite their particular demographic pressures, both Sweden and Finland have managed to avoid short-changing the interests of the younger generation, and indeed are making highly targeted investments in the capabilities and opportunities for participation of young people and families.

Figure 34: Old Age Dependency Ratio



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013).

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In considering Italy, demographically the oldest EU member, it becomes by contrast quite evident how unjust the distribution of participation opportunities between the generations can be. On the one hand, the state is not particularly active in the support of families and young people, relying

strongly instead on private structures: “Italian society has traditionally relied very much upon its very strong family institutions. The family (often in its extended version) today remains a major provider of welfare for its weakest components – children, young couples with precarious jobs and elders. Within the family, significant amounts of monetary redistribution take place, and important services are provided, such as the care of preschool age children by grandparents. Partly because of this reliance, family support policies have been generally weak. Apart from relatively generous rules on maternity leave (paid for by social insurance) and limited tax deductions for children, the state has not offered much. Public day care facilities for preschool children are available on a limited scale and vary significantly across regions. Private firms and public offices have only recently started offering similar services, with some support from the state.”⁸⁶ Reconciling a professional career and family is often very difficult as a consequence of this weak child-care infrastructure, particularly if the family cannot or does not want to compensate for state-policy deficits.

A look at pension policy in addition to family policy makes it clear that today’s shortcomings in terms of justice for the younger generation might be exacerbated in the future. For example, while important reforms aimed at improved pension-system sustainability were carried out under the recent Monti government, “the current situation, however, is less positive from the point of view of intergenerational fairness, as the younger generations will receive smaller amounts upon retirement. This problem is worsened by the increasingly late or even entirely absent entry into the labor force of the younger cohorts due to the economic crisis. The problem of poverty prevention which exists today for a relatively limited share of the population will be much more significant and relevant for the young cohorts of today when they reach retirement age”.⁸⁷ A very similar constellation of problems is evident in Greece and Cyprus, which number among the EU countries with the greatest reform needs with regard both to family and pension policies.

Another aspect holding considerable importance in the realization of intergenerational justice is environmental policy. It is only through the conservation and renewal of natural resources that environmental conditions can be fairly preserved for future generations. Among EU countries, Sweden and Latvia achieve the best results in this area. Both countries are among the EU states with the highest share of renewable energy in their total energy consumption, as well as the lowest per capita greenhouse gas emissions. In their latest SGI report, the country experts also emphasize the two governments’ targeted environmental policies and individual instruments: “The Climate Change Financial Instrument, funded through Latvia’s participation in the International Emissions Trading Scheme, is the country’s main policy instrument in the area of climate change. In 2011, a total of 1,428 projects worth LVL 56.57 million were approved in areas such as energy effectiveness, technology development for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, switching from fossil to renewable energy sources. Latvia’s Environmental Policy Strategy for 2009 – 2015 prioritizes policy interventions in Baltic Sea marine water quality and wastewater purification. (...)

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Terauda/Reetz/Jahn (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.



Protection of forests is well organized and secured through legislation, which regulates all related economic activities, including forest harvesting, forest management plans, forest regeneration and monitoring, and control of forest tree species. (...) Biodiversity in Latvia means coastal biodiversity, with unique brackish water ecological systems at the shore of the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Riga, as well as forest ecosystems and bogs and fens. Protected areas, including Natura 2000 territories, cover 11.9% of Latvia's territory. A law called On Protection of Species and Habitats also provides for the establishment of micro-reserves to protect small-scale but biologically valuable areas outside of protected territories. Over 2,000 micro-reserves had been established as of 2012.⁸⁸


For Sweden too, the SGI experts paint a very positive picture with regard to protection of critical natural resources and the shaping of sensible environmental policy for future generations: "CO₂ emissions are decreasing, biodiversity is improving and its ecological footprint, while still high, is slowly decreasing. Moreover, the government is gradually shifting toward an increase in 'green taxes.' In addition, environmental policy is an integrated component of the larger project of restructuring the economy and making it more environmentally friendly. It is also noteworthy that the Green Party, as a pivotal party in parliament during the period under review, was working to strengthen environmental policies considerably."⁸⁹ However, it should also be noted that Sweden's low CO₂ emissions are dependent on the country's continued heavy reliance on nuclear energy. This course is highly controversial within the country's society. The Fukushima catastrophe has underscored that nuclear energy can only be regarded as an intergenerationally just and "clean" form of energy production if accidents with serious consequences can genuinely be ruled out. However, this is never the case. In addition, the perspective of intergenerational justice prompts the question of how nuclear waste that will remain radioactive for millennia can be "safely" stored. In this context, the recent decision of the German government to phase out nuclear energy is a sensible and important step. However, for a truly intergenerationally just environmental policy, the transition from nuclear energy and fossil fuels must drive a decisive shift to renewable energies.

In addition to the above environmental indicators, some forward-looking fiscal policy indicators are also included in order to assess a country's record regarding intergenerational justice. The first is the expenditure on research and development. This plays a decisive role in determining a country's innovative capacity, and thus in future increases in wealth. Finland and Sweden are the only EU countries that have a total (public and private) expenditure of more than 3 percent of its GDP - thereby exceeding the target of 3 percent of the Europe 2020 strategy. Also, Denmark and Germany, both at rank three, already come quite close to this target. As a whole, however, the European Union remains very far from the three percent target. The average EU-wide investment rate is just 1.67 percent, representing a slightly increasing trend relative to the 2011 and 2008 Social Justice Index.

⁸⁹ Pierre/Jochem/Jahn (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁹⁰ Molina/Homs/Colino (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

Figure 35: Renewable Energy (share of gross final energy consumption)



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012).


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Greece, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus show the lowest levels of public and private investment in research and development, possibly thereby undermining the long-term competitiveness of their countries. Indeed, while many countries implemented austerity measures affecting this policy field in the course of the crisis, its direct relevance to the future renders such decisions dangerous. The SGI report for Spain makes this very clear: “Although it is true that there has been an increase in the public spending devoted to innovation since the turn of the century, the crisis has hit this strategic field and the draconian cuts implemented in the last three years have worsened the earlier situation – which was not brilliant, either. (...) The government’s pledge to



promote a new model of economic growth based on brainpower rather than on construction after the bursting of the housing bubble has not been reflected in the budget. On the contrary, the national research council CSIC (the largest Spanish scientific institution with 6,000 scientists and more than a hundred institutes) signaled in 2013 that a ‘catastrophe’ in its research centers may happen if no extra money was found. Its budget has fallen by 30% from 2008 levels, and it only offered 13 permanent positions in 2013, compared with 263 in 2008. At the regional level, the promotion of research has also suffered a lot. Many promising young researchers are going abroad since it is difficult to be scientifically competitive in a climate of such uncertainty with scarce

Figure 36: Total R&D Spending



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2007, 2009; c: 2012).

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resources and excessive bureaucracy. The only positive side of this dangerous situation with its draconian constraints and dangerous brain drain, is that public awareness of the relevance of R&D policies has grown significantly.”⁹⁰

Another indicator providing information about the future viability of a country’s economy from the perspective of intergenerational justice is debt level relative to economic output. The debt-to-GDP indicator reflects the financial burden that will be left to future generations. The range of variance within the European Union with respect to this key indicator is enormous. Estonia is particularly successful here, having been able to implement a strict fiscal policy even in the years of crisis and massive recession, thus keeping debt at a very low level.⁹¹ With debt at just 11 percent of GDP, the Baltic country is the European Union’s least indebted, meaning that future generations will not be excessively and unjustly burdened. As Estonia also performs well in most other indicators of intergenerational justice, from family policy to environmental policy, this small country also ranks very highly in the index category overall.

By contrast, a very different picture is evident in the majority of EU countries, with many having accumulated veritable mountains of debt. More than half the countries in the European Union are far to very far from meeting the Maastricht criteria of debt levels of 60 percent of GDP. The increase in debt in recent years is alarming: Greece’s debt, which in 2008 already amounted to a disturbing 113 percent of GDP, rose to 174 percent of GDP by 2013. In other countries affected by the euro crisis – particularly Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal – the trend is similar. However, the debt levels of other major EU economies remain worrying as well. The United Kingdom and France today have debt levels of more than 90 percent of GDP, and even Germany’s remains at 78 percent. To be sure, the current SGI data show that many countries have undertaken budgetary consolidation efforts, and from an economic perspective, the worst appears in many cases to be in the past. However, in the large majority of countries, this has not yet been reflected in the labor market or in a clear improvement of the social situation.

Without question, in the interests of future generations EU member states must consistently pursue the goal of fiscal consolidation. Germany, for example, plans in 2015 to again be able to present a balanced budget without new borrowing. Moreover, with the implementation of a debt brake anchored in the country’s Basic Law, it has a useful instrument that is being closely observed abroad. However, budgetary cuts should not take place simply for the sake of cutting.

⁹¹ Toots/Reetz/Jahn (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁹² Molina/Homs/Colino (2014), available at www.sgi-network.org.



Figure 37: General Government Gross Debt



Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2012, 2013).

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Rather, when engaging in fiscal consolidation, policymakers should take care that investment in policy areas critical to the future can be maintained to the greatest degree possible. Massive savings coming from the areas of education or research and development come at too great a cost from the perspective of social justice as well as from that of the economic sustainability of the member states. Indeed, cuts in these areas are extremely dangerous.

5. Conclusion

1. Growing social divide within Europe

Our analysis has shown that social justice is overall on the decline in the member states of the European Union. In addition, social justice is realized to substantially different degrees within the EU.

Six dimensions of social justice are analyzed here: poverty prevention, access to education, access to the labor market, social cohesion, non-discrimination, health and intergenerational equity. The northern European countries of Sweden, Finland and Denmark, as well as the Netherlands emerge as leaders in this comparative assessment. By contrast, social injustice has again significantly increased in the crisis-battered countries of Greece, Spain and Italy, as well as in Ireland and Hungary. This deterioration has certainly been intensified by the rigid austerity policies implemented in the course of the crisis, as well as the structural reforms aimed at economic and budget-policy stabilization. In these countries, cuts have not successfully been administered in a socially just manner. Overall, across the period considered here, only Luxembourg, Germany and Poland were able to show significant improvements as compared to the 2008 Social Justice Index.

The strength of the Nordic countries of Sweden, Finland and Denmark, as well as of the Netherlands (ranks one to four) is primarily due to good performances in the areas of poverty reduction, labor market access, social cohesion and non-discrimination. Here, the challenges for the future lie in overcoming what are still poor labor market access opportunities for immigrants, as well as in combating the relatively high levels of youth unemployment that have persisted for years in Sweden (23.5%) and Finland (19.9%).

Though the situation in Germany has improved thanks to very robust labor market developments during the crisis, this must not be allowed to obscure the fact that here, as in similar continental European welfare states, further reforms are needed. These include the presence of a dual labor market with minimal vertical permeability from “atypical” employment relationships (expanding low-wage sector, temporary employment) to “normal employment relationships,” as well as the persistently strong influence of social background on students’ educational achievements.

However, the problems at the lower end of the rankings are of an altogether different grade: Greece and other southern European states currently suffer from youth unemployment rates of up to 58 percent, a rapid increase in the risk of poverty particularly for children and youth, health care systems badly affected by austerity measures, and an enormous mountain of debt that represents a mortgage on coming generations’ futures.



In this context, it is worth noting that the crisis has had a different impact on the various generations. In comparing child and old-age poverty, for example, our analysis has shown that children and youth have been disproportionately more strongly affected and disadvantaged by the negative developments of recent years.


The growing gap between northern Europe and the crisis-struck southern countries threatens social cohesion inside the EU over the medium term, and in the long run even the future viability of the entire European integration project.

2. Economic success does not guarantee social justice

How can the differences in terms of social justice within Europe be explained? The large variations described in the study beg the question whether these can be solely due to economic disparities between the countries? In other words, are some countries more socially just simply because they are economically stronger overall?

Figure 38: GDP per Capita and Social Justice

Unit: SJI Score / GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international \$)



Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators, extracted June 15, 2014.

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Figure 38 shows the answer: Economic performance as measured on the basis of GDP is in fact positively associated with performance on the Social Justice Index. Countries with a higher economic performance level are on average also more socially just. However, a closer look reveals very interesting differences between countries with regard to their ability to enable all citizens to benefit from prosperity.

The Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia in particular show that a comparatively high degree of social justice is possible despite a merely middling economic performance. These countries thus appear more effective in translating economic strength into fairness within society, and illustrate the fact that social policy - besides economic productivity - plays a critical role in achieving social justice. Estonia's good performance is primarily driven by the areas of education and intergenerational justice, while the Czech Republic excels in poverty prevention.

By contrast, Greece, Spain and Italy have a comparably high GDP per capita, but perform far worse in the Social Justice Index rankings. By the same token, Ireland has about the same per capita GDP as Germany or even Sweden, the top performer in terms of social justice. However, Ireland falls only into the lower midrange with regard to social justice despite its high GDP. Spain, Greece, Italy and Ireland would thus do well to concentrate their efforts in coming years not only on returning to a stable path of growth, but also on improving participation opportunities for a broader portion of the population.

3. Social justice must take a place at the center of the European political agenda

In the recent crisis years, the European political discourse has been dominated by the issues of a euro rescue, budgetary consolidation and economic recovery. Against a background of harsh austerity policies, the call for more social justice has certainly become stronger in many countries. The EU's own efforts to create a more socially just Europe, however, have remained rather feeble, at least as perceived by the general public.

In this regard, the European Union is by no means inactive or lacking specific goals in the area of social policy. Yet in most areas relevant to social policy, broad and independent competences possess only support functions. Under current treaty provisions, existing EU-level instruments for the strengthening of the social dimension are quite reasonable, and in the context of the OMC and in the rhythm of the European Semester also produce certain effects within the individual member states. However, despite the formulation of specific social policy objectives at the EU level - for example, the sociopolitical goals of the Europe 2020 strategy and the accompanying European Platform Against Poverty and Social Exclusion - there is as yet no integrated EU strategy which consistently and comprehensively combines the two key objectives: growth *and* social justice.



Existing instruments to foster social inclusion, as well as goals formulated in areas such as poverty prevention, employment, health and education, appear to external observers to be rather loosely linked or even somewhat arbitrary. In addition, the complex mechanisms of the OMC, as well as the ongoing production of country-specific reports, are familiar only to a professional public of negligible size. The general public takes virtually no notice of these important EU efforts.

This is a wasted opportunity indeed. The EU could achieve considerable public support and thus strengthen its own legitimacy if it were to engage in stronger communication around the goals already formulated in the EU treaties for the promotion of a more socially just Europe. Bundling currently existing individual goals and instruments into a comprehensive and consistent EU strategy for combating social injustice, and intensifying communication around this strategy, is therefore highly desirable, and would clearly be covered by existing treaty provisions (Art. 3 TEU). A broader public awareness is also absolutely necessary in order to develop strong political leverage for the implementation of social policy goals. Peer pressure comes primarily from the public. A regular, clearly communicable comparative ranking of social justice can additionally be very helpful here in increasing political pressure to act within the individual member states.

Admittedly, the development of a coherent and strategy for social justice would not expand the EU's treaty-derived competences; the commission still could not – as in the case of the Stability and Growth Pact – sanction member-state failures through the imposition of penalties. However, to a greater degree than in the past, the Commission could publicly emphasize the goal of a socially just Europe as a guiding principle for member-state action, and monitor public communications around the issue more effectively. In addition, the EU's existing social inclusion initiatives – such as the strengthened role of poverty reduction within the European Social Fund for 2014 - 2020 or the Commission's recent Social Investment Package for the promotion of investment in individual participation opportunities – could be strengthened and provided with new momentum on such a new discursive basis. Moreover, new ideas such as the European unemployment insurance system currently being discussed could be promoted more strongly under such a legitimacy-creating basis.

4. Inclusive and sustainable growth: Steering the right course between fiscal consolidation and future-oriented investment

Without question, the consolidation of national budgets through consistent debt reduction remains an absolute necessity within the EU if future generations' participation opportunities are to be ensured. Germany's "debt brake," a disciplining instrument now anchored in the country's Basic Law, is in this context a sensible policy innovation that can help to limit and reduce excessive state debt. The stability goals formulated in the EU's Stability and Growth Pact should serve to guide member states' actions.

If in pursuing the goal of budgetary consolidation cuts are the primary step being taken, a distinction should be drawn between short-term and longer-term effects of savings within specific policy areas. In the interests of sustainable policymaking, national governments should take a fundamentally long-term-oriented perspective, and make use of appropriate evidence-based instruments for policy planning and regulatory impact assessment. To the greatest degree possible, decisions on the allocation of public resources or on possible savings mechanisms should be based on instruments that preclude negative long-term consequences.

Massive cuts in areas such as education or research and development have negative long-term consequences not only from the perspective of social justice, but also in economic terms. The examples from Spain cited in the current SGI report are quite telling in this regard. The experts warn that cuts in the area of education diminish access opportunities for socially vulnerable people. Moreover, the consequences of the massive cuts in the field of research and development are already evident; through the migration of many young scientists and scholars abroad – the SGI country experts speak here of a dangerous “brain drain”⁹² – Spain’s innovation capacity as a desirable economic and social location is weakened over the long term.

The close reciprocal relationship between the goal of social justice on the one hand and economic prosperity and performance is illustrated most clearly by this point. This relationship should in no way be viewed as an automatic trade-off. On the contrary, investments in people’s participation opportunities – particularly with regard to education – are not only sensible for reasons of social justice; they are also essential from the perspective of economic growth and in maintaining and increasing a country’s potential for innovation. Thus, for all EU member states, the establishment of equal participation opportunities is both an ethical and normative duty in the interests of societal solidarity and mutual responsibility, and a fundamental investment in the sustainability of society itself. A lack of opportunities for participation in areas such as education, the labor market or health care is economically dangerous, as are high levels of social exclusion that often result from them. Today’s social-policy failings, as well as short-sighted and ill-thought-out consolidation policies, could lead to costly consequences in the future; a post facto effort to compensate for and repair social exclusion is generally a considerably worse alternative than proactive and well-targeted investment in social participation.



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8. Appendix

Table 1a: Overview of results

Rank	Country	Weighted Index			Unweighted Index			Poverty Prevention			Equitable Education		
		2008	2011	2014	2008	2011	2014	2008	2011	2014	2008	2011	2014
6	Austria	6.82	6.72	6.61	6.85	6.67	6.64	7.00	6.93	6.51	5.87	5.82	5.91
11	Belgium	6.17	6.24	6.16	6.32	6.36	6.27	5.84	6.17	5.84	6.09	5.99	6.31
26	Bulgaria*			3.75			4.23			1.00			5.09
22	Croatia*			4.74			4.93			3.31			7.00
19	Cyprus*			5.09			5.11			4.54			6.46
5	Czech Republic	6.62	6.67	6.63	6.49	6.49	6.48	7.22	7.64	7.50	6.33	6.50	6.40
3	Denmark	7.39	7.08	7.06	7.46	7.17	7.20	6.98	6.79	6.46	7.29	6.98	7.20
10	Estonia*			6.19			6.20			5.39			7.15
2	Finland	7.20	7.10	7.13	7.30	7.18	7.15	6.84	6.96	7.17	7.13	7.08	6.98
12	France	6.24	6.15	6.12	6.25	6.13	6.13	6.46	6.58	6.44	5.47	5.30	5.43
7	Germany	6.10	6.26	6.55	6.14	6.30	6.61	6.08	6.22	6.32	5.65	5.65	6.03
28	Greece	4.43	4.44	3.57	4.42	4.47	3.73	4.26	4.42	2.76	4.01	4.01	4.56
25	Hungary	5.07	4.79	4.44	5.19	4.95	4.63	4.00	3.95	3.02	6.03	5.51	5.64
18	Ireland	5.97	5.47	5.10	6.04	5.71	5.42	5.49	4.87	3.85	5.17	5.11	5.13
24	Italy	5.16	5.16	4.70	5.16	5.13	4.77	4.80	5.11	4.23	5.36	5.25	5.16
23	Latvia*			4.70			4.95			2.65			6.44
15	Lithuania*			5.37			5.74			3.26			7.19
8	Luxembourg	6.38	6.47	6.54	6.43	6.62	6.65	7.19	6.74	6.60	4.44	5.14	6.19
14	Malta*			5.50			5.50			5.49			4.67
4	Netherlands	7.09	7.05	6.96	7.14	7.02	6.96	7.24	7.38	7.41	6.14	6.30	5.99
16	Poland	4.37	5.01	5.36	4.62	5.08	5.37	2.81	4.37	4.85	5.87	5.87	6.45
20	Portugal	5.11	5.15	5.03	5.12	5.23	5.14	5.04	5.06	4.97	4.22	4.30	4.71
27	Romania*			3.69			4.06			1.08			5.10
17	Slovakia	5.47	5.40	5.16	5.46	5.22	5.08	5.91	6.32	6.27	5.54	5.80	4.62
9	Slovenia*			6.34			6.35			6.32			6.92
21	Spain	5.59	5.13	4.85	5.72	5.32	5.09	5.44	5.16	4.49	4.63	4.84	5.27
1	Sweden	7.53	7.34	7.48	7.62	7.57	7.63	7.67	7.19	7.26	6.79	6.75	7.42
13	United Kingdom	5.94	5.95	5.94	6.03	6.05	6.09	5.61	5.75	5.25	5.03	5.02	5.74

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2009 and 2011.

Source: Own representation.

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Table 1b: Overview of results

Country		Labor Market Access			Social Cohesion and Non-discrimination			Health			Intergenerational Justice		
Rank	Country	2008	2011	2014	2008	2011	2014	2008	2011	2014	2008	2011	2014
6	Austria	7.24	7.46	7.33	6.86	6.39	6.49	7.78	7.48	7.48	6.32	5.96	6.12
11	Belgium	5.98	5.89	5.93	7.16	7.06	6.59	7.68	7.97	7.92	5.19	5.07	5.04
26	Bulgaria*			5.07			4.45			4.31			5.44
22	Croatia*			4.16			4.31			6.04			4.79
19	Cyprus*			4.76			4.91			6.15			3.81
5	Czech Republic	6.48	5.92	6.02	6.15	6.07	5.84	7.01	7.25	7.40	5.72	5.58	5.71
3	Denmark	7.89	7.25	7.28	7.68	7.49	7.45	8.18	7.47	7.73	6.74	7.02	7.09
10	Estonia*			6.78			5.83			5.19			6.85
2	Finland	7.34	6.93	7.10	7.88	7.56	7.67	7.11	6.77	6.66	7.51	7.77	7.32
12	France	6.47	6.25	6.11	5.95	5.49	5.97	7.34	7.44	7.25	5.83	5.71	5.57
7	Germany	6.36	6.72	7.19	6.60	6.71	7.33	6.74	7.09	7.20	5.42	5.42	5.57
28	Greece	5.22	4.72	3.23	4.55	4.62	3.74	5.68	6.13	4.68	2.82	2.93	3.41
25	Hungary	5.61	4.76	4.95	5.21	5.10	4.61	5.56	5.24	4.97	4.70	5.15	4.61
18	Ireland	7.29	5.65	5.65	6.09	6.06	6.07	6.74	7.33	6.75	5.46	5.21	5.06
24	Italy	5.71	5.33	4.79	5.13	4.81	4.80	6.41	6.47	5.90	3.53	3.79	3.73
23	Latvia*			5.62			5.16			3.14			6.67
15	Lithuania*			5.56			5.88			6.25			6.30
8	Luxembourg	6.33	6.39	6.11	7.12	7.38	7.37	8.24	8.21	8.12	5.28	5.86	5.51
14	Malta*			6.29			5.22			7.13			4.23
4	Netherlands	7.43	7.34	6.97	8.04	7.98	7.96	8.18	7.70	8.00	5.83	5.42	5.43
16	Poland	4.55	5.01	5.24	4.89	5.16	5.88	4.47	4.66	4.26	5.12	5.40	5.56
20	Portugal	6.14	5.74	4.86	6.12	5.72	5.77	4.23	5.52	5.87	4.95	5.01	4.65
27	Romania*			5.31			4.46			3.19			5.24
17	Slovakia	4.55	4.29	3.98	5.73	4.68	5.15	5.42	4.88	5.32	5.63	5.32	5.17
9	Slovenia*			5.79			6.43			6.28			6.35
21	Spain	6.06	4.27	3.70	6.30	5.81	5.45	7.04	6.85	7.00	4.82	4.99	4.63
1	Sweden	7.42	6.85	7.02	7.98	8.02	8.06	7.75	8.41	8.15	8.13	8.18	7.87
13	United Kingdom	7.04	6.70	6.67	6.29	6.28	6.10	6.77	6.98	7.26	5.43	5.55	5.49

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2009 and 2011.

Source: Own representation.

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Table 2: Dimension I: Poverty prevention

Indicator	Definition	Source
A1 At Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion, Total Population	People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, total population (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012, 2013), extracted August 1, 2014
A2 At Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion, Children (0-17)	People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, age less than 18 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012, 2013), extracted August 1, 2014
A3 At Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion, Seniors (65+)	People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, age 65 years or over (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012, 2013), extracted August 1, 2014
A4 Population Living in Quasi-Jobless Households	People living in households with very low work intensity, 0 to 59 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012, 2013), extracted August 1, 2014
A5 Severe Material Deprivation, Total Population	Severe material deprivation rate, total population (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012, 2013), extracted August 1, 2014
A6 Severe Material Deprivation, Children (0-17)	Severe material deprivation rate, age less than 18 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012, 2013), extracted August 1, 2014
A7 Severe Material Deprivation, Seniors (65+)	Severe material deprivation rate, age 65 years and over (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012, 2013), extracted August 1, 2014
A8 Income Poverty, Total Population	At risk of poverty (cut-off point: 60% of median equivalised income after social transfers), total population (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012, 2013), extracted August 1, 2014
A9 Income Poverty, Children (0-17)	At risk of poverty (cut-off point: 60% of median equivalised income after social transfers), age less than 18 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012, 2013), extracted August 1, 2014
A10 Income Poverty, Seniors (65+)	At risk of poverty (cut-off point: 60% of median equivalised income after social transfers), age 65 years and over (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012, 2013), extracted August 1, 2014

Source: Data refer to SJI 2008 as „a“, SJI 2011 as „b“ and SJI 2014 as „c“.

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Table 3: Dimension II: Equitable Education

Indicator	Definition	Source
B1 Education Policy (SGI)	Policy achievements in delivering high-quality, equitable education and training	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2014, expert assessment (indicator P7.1) "To what extent does education policy in your country deliver high-quality, equitable and efficient education and training?"
B2 PISA, Impact of Socioeconomic Factors on Educational Performance	PISA results, product of slope of ESCS for reading and strength of relationship between reading and ESCS	OECD PISA (data refer to a: 2006; b: 2009; c: 2012) (Data for Malta are missing; imputed value=mean)
B3 Pre-primary Education Expenditure	Total public expenditure on education as % of GDP, at pre-primary level of education and not allocated by level (% of GDP)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006; b: 2004, 2007, 2008; c: 2004, 2011), extracted July 25, 2014
B4 Early School Leavers	Early leavers from education and training, age 18 to 24 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013), extracted July 25, 2014

Source: Data refer to SJI 2008 as „a“, SJI 2011 as „b“ and SJI 2014 as „c“.

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Table 4: Dimension III: Labor Market Access

Indicator	Definition	Source
C1 Employment Rate	Employment rate, age 15 to 64 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013), extracted July 25, 2014
C2 Older Employment Rate	Employment rate, age 55 to 64 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013), extracted July 25, 2014
C3 Foreign-born To Native Employment	Ratio of foreign-born to native-born employment rates, age 15 to 64 years; Transformation: 1-x	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013), extracted July 25, 2014
C4 Employment Rates By Gender, Women/Men	Ratio of employment rates women/men, age 15 to 64 years; Transformation: 1-x	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013), extracted July 25, 2014
C5 Unemployment Rate	Unemployment rate, age 15 to 64 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013), extracted July 25, 2014
C6 Long-term Unemployment Rate	Unemployment rate, unemployed greater than or equal to 1 year (% of labor force)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013), extracted July 25, 2014
C7 Youth Unemployment Rate	Unemployment rate, age 15 to 24 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013), extracted July 25, 2014
C8 Low-skilled Unemployment Rate	Unemployment rate, age 15 to 64 years, less than upper secondary education (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013), extracted July 25, 2014
C9 Main Reason For Temporary Employment: Couldn't Get Permanent Job	Main reason for temporary employment: Could not find permanent job, age 15 to 64 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013), extracted July 25, 2014
C10 In-work Poverty Rate	In-work at-risk-of-poverty rate, full-time workers (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012, 2013), extracted July 25, 2014
C11 Low Pay Incidence	Low-wage earners as a proportion of all employees with low education (excluding apprentices) (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2006; b: 2010; c: 2010), extracted August 5, 2014

Source: Data refer to SJI 2008 as „a“, SJI 2011 as „b“ and SJI 2014 as „c“.

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Table 5: Dimension IV: Social Cohesion and Non-discrimination

Indicator	Definition	Source
D1 Social Inclusion (SGI)	Policy performance in terms of strengthening social cohesion and inclusion	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2014, expert assessment (indicator P8.1) "To what extent does social policy in your country prevent exclusion and decoupling from society?"
D2 Gini Coefficient	Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012, 2013), extracted July 25, 2014
D3 Non-discrimination (SGI)	Policy performance regarding non-discrimination	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2014, expert assessment (indicator D3.3) "How effectively does the state protect against different forms of discrimination?"
D4 Gender Equality in Parliaments	Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%); Transformation: $ 50-x $	World Bank Gender Statistics Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013), extracted July 25, 2014
D5 Integration Policy (SGI)	Policy performance regarding the integration of migrants into society	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2014, expert assessment (indicator P12.1) "How effectively do policies in your country support the integration of migrants into society?"
D6 NEET Rate	Young people not employed and not participating in education or training, 20 to 24 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013), extracted July 25, 2014

Source: Data refer to SJI 2008 as „a“, SJI 2011 as „b“ and SJI 2014 as „c“.

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Table 6: Dimension V: Health

Indicator	Definition	Source
E1 Health Policy (SGI)	Policy achievements in providing high-quality, inclusive and cost-efficient health care	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2014, expert assessment (indicator P9.1) "To what extent do health care policies in your country provide high-quality, inclusive and cost-efficient health care?"
E2 Self-reported Unmet Needs for Medical Help	Self-reported unmet needs for medical examination; Reason: too expensive or too far to travel or waiting list (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2011, 2012), extracted July 7, 2014
E3 Healthy Life Expectancy	Healthy life years at birth, total population	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2011, 2012), extracted May 8, 2014
E4 Accessibility and Range (based on EHCI)	Euro Health Consumer Index, Accessibility and Range; Mean of standardized index values "Waiting Time for Treatment" and "Range and Reach of Services Provided"	Euro Health Consumer Index (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2009; c: 2013)
E5 Health Systems' Outcomes (based on EHCI)	Euro Health Consumer Index, Outcomes; Standardized index values "Outcome"	Euro Health Consumer Index (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2009; c: 2013)

Source: Data refer to SJI 2008 as „a“, SJI 2011 as „b“ and SJI 2014 as „c“.

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Table 7: Dimension VI: Intergenerational Justice

Indicator	Definition	Source
F1 Family Policy (SGI)	Policy performance in allowing women to combine parenting and work	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2014, expert assessment (indicator P10.1) "To what extent do family support policies in your country enable women to combine parenting with participation in the labor market?"
F2 Pension Policy (SGI)	Policy performance in providing pensions that prevent poverty, are intergenerationally just and fiscally sustainable	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2014, expert assessment (indicator P11.1) "To what extent does pension policy in your country realize goals of poverty prevention, intergenerational equity and fiscal sustainability?"
F3 Environmental Policy (SGI)	Policy performance in the sustainable treatment and use of natural resources and the environment	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2014, expert assessment (indicator P15.1) "How effectively does environmental policy in your country protect and preserve the sustainability of natural resources and quality of the environment?"
F4 Greenhouse Gas Emissions	Greenhouse Gas Emissions, including "Land Use", "Land-Use Change" and "Forestry" (LLUCF), tonnes in CO2 equivalents per capita	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012), extracted July 25, 2014
F5 Renewable Energy (Consumption)	Share of energy from renewable sources in gross final energy consumption (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009; c: 2012), extracted July 25, 2014
F6 Total R&D Spending	Total intramural R&D expenditure, all sectors (% of GDP)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2007, 2009; c: 2012), extracted July 25, 2014
F7 General Government Gross Debt	General government gross debt (% of GDP)	IMF World Economic Outlook Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2012, 2013), extracted April 13, 2014
F8 Old Age Dependency Ratio	Old age dependency ratio (% of working-age population)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013) (Data for Malta are missing; imputed value=mean), extracted July 25, 2014

Source: Data refer to SJI 2008 as „a“, SJI 2011 as „b“ and SJI 2014 as „c“.

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Table 8a: SJI 2008 raw data

Country	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7	A8	A9	A10	B1	B2	B3	B4
Austria	16.7%	18.5%	15.1%	8.2%	3.3%	3.7%	2.1%	12.0%	14.8%	14.0%	7	6.0	0.4%	10.1%
Belgium	21.6%	21.6%	25.0%	13.8%	5.7%	7.0%	3.6%	15.2%	16.9%	23.0%	7	7.6	0.7%	12.0%
Bulgaria*	60.7%	60.8%	71.1%	16.0%	57.6%	58.3%	67.2%	22.0%	29.9%	23.9%		12.5	0.7%	14.8%
Croatia*								18.0%	16.0%	30.0%		3.3	0.6%	3.7%
Cyprus*	25.2%	20.8%	55.6%	3.7%	13.3%	11.7%	19.4%	15.5%	12.4%	50.6%			0.3%	13.7%
Czech Republic	15.8%	21.5%	10.9%	8.6%	7.4%	10.0%	6.5%	9.6%	16.6%	5.5%	7	6.4	0.5%	5.6%
Denmark	16.8%	14.2%	18.3%	10.1%	3.3%	4.8%	0.8%	11.7%	9.6%	17.7%	7	3.5	0.9%	12.5%
Estonia*	22.0%	20.1%	35.4%	6.2%	5.6%	4.1%	7.9%	19.4%	18.2%	33.2%		2.2	0.4%	14.0%
EU Average	24.5%	26.0%	27.7%	8.9%	11.0%	11.8%	12.3%	15.9%	18.7%	20.9%		5.4	0.5%	13.4%
Finland	17.4%	15.1%	23.1%	8.8%	3.6%	3.4%	2.6%	13.0%	10.9%	21.6%	10	2.2	0.3%	9.8%
France	19.0%	19.6%	15.2%	9.6%	4.7%	5.4%	3.4%	13.1%	15.3%	13.1%	5	7.9	0.6%	11.5%
Germany	20.6%	19.7%	16.8%	11.5%	4.8%	5.4%	2.2%	15.2%	14.1%	16.2%	7	7.5	0.5%	11.8%
Greece	28.3%	28.2%	30.6%	8.1%	11.5%	9.7%	17.4%	20.3%	23.3%	22.9%	2	3.7	0.1%	14.8%
Hungary	29.4%	34.1%	21.1%	11.3%	19.9%	24.4%	17.2%	12.3%	18.8%	6.1%	5	8.7	1.0%	11.7%
Ireland	23.1%	26.2%	28.7%	14.3%	4.5%	7.6%	1.2%	17.2%	19.2%	28.3%	7	4.6	0.0%	11.3%
Italy	26.0%	29.3%	25.3%	10.0%	6.8%	7.9%	6.3%	19.8%	25.4%	21.9%	5	2.2	0.5%	19.7%
Latvia*	35.1%	32.8%	51.4%	6.2%	24.0%	20.5%	35.8%	21.2%	19.8%	35.6%		2.9	0.7%	15.5%
Lithuania*	28.7%	29.9%	39.1%	6.4%	16.6%	15.9%	20.8%	19.1%	22.1%	29.8%		5.4	0.6%	7.5%
Luxembourg	15.9%	21.2%	7.2%	5.0%	0.8%	0.7%	0.6%	13.5%	19.9%	7.2%	3	8.5	0.5%	13.4%
Malta*	19.7%	23.9%	22.8%	9.6%	4.4%	6.4%	3.1%	15.1%	19.8%	20.3%			1.0%	27.2%
Netherlands	15.7%	17.2%	9.8%	9.7%	1.7%	1.9%	0.7%	10.2%	14.0%	9.5%	8	5.5	0.4%	11.4%
Poland	34.4%	37.1%	27.3%	10.1%	22.3%	22.5%	23.7%	17.3%	24.2%	7.8%	4	5.6	0.5%	5.0%
Portugal	25.0%	26.9%	30.0%	7.2%	9.6%	11.8%	10.7%	18.1%	20.9%	25.5%	5	5.8	0.5%	35.4%
Romania*	45.9%	50.5%	57.7%	8.4%	36.5%	40.4%	48.9%	24.8%	32.8%	30.6%		3.5	0.7%	15.9%
Slovakia	21.3%	25.8%	22.0%	6.4%	13.7%	16.3%	17.7%	10.6%	17.0%	9.6%	4	6.6	0.5%	6.0%
Slovenia*	17.1%	14.7%	22.4%	7.3%	5.1%	4.4%	6.6%	11.5%	11.3%	19.4%		5.9	0.5%	5.1%
Spain	23.3%	28.6%	27.8%	6.8%	3.5%	4.4%	3.6%	19.7%	26.2%	26.1%	5	2.8	0.6%	31.7%
Sweden	13.9%	14.9%	10.4%	6.0%	2.2%	3.2%	0.6%	10.5%	12.0%	9.9%	7	3.0	0.6%	7.9%
United Kingdom	22.6%	27.6%	27.9%	10.4%	4.2%	6.3%	1.9%	18.6%	23.0%	26.5%	6	5.3	0.4%	17.0%

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2009.

Source: Own representation.

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Table 8b: SJI 2008 raw data

Country	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9	C10	C11
Austria	72.1%	41.0%	0.1	0.2	3.9%	0.9%	8.0%	8.1%	12.5%	5.3%	29.9%
Belgium	62.4%	34.5%	0.2	0.2	7.0%	3.3%	18.0%	12.5%	78.6%	3.5%	14.5%
Bulgaria*	64.0%	46.0%	0.1	0.1	5.7%	2.9%	12.7%	14.9%	63.6%	5.1%	26.1%
Croatia*	57.8%	36.7%	0.0	0.2	8.6%	5.3%	21.9%	10.6%	52.5%		
Cyprus*	70.9%	54.8%	0.0	0.2	3.8%	0.5%	9.0%	5.2%	90.9%	5.7%	33.9%
Czech Republic	66.6%	47.6%	0.0	0.2	4.4%	2.2%	9.9%	19.4%	67.7%	3.2%	39.1%
Denmark	77.9%	58.4%	0.1	0.1	3.5%	0.5%	8.0%	5.5%	38.9%	3.7%	17.8%
Estonia*	70.1%	62.3%	0.1	0.1	5.6%	1.7%	12.0%	12.2%	32.2%	7.2%	40.0%
EU Average	66.0%	46.2%	0.1	0.2	6.4%	2.4%	15.2%	12.0%	57.8%	6.5%	30.2%
Finland	71.1%	56.5%	0.1	0.1	6.4%	1.2%	16.5%	12.8%	61.9%	3.4%	8.2%
France	64.8%	38.2%	0.1	0.1	7.4%	2.8%	18.6%	11.8%	55.9%	5.3%	14.5%
Germany	70.1%	53.7%	0.1	0.2	7.6%	4.0%	10.6%	15.6%	24.0%	6.1%	38.5%
Greece	61.9%	42.8%	0.1	0.4	7.8%	3.7%	22.1%	7.6%	82.5%	12.9%	20.7%
Hungary	56.7%	31.4%	0.1	0.2	7.9%	3.6%	19.9%	18.9%	59.8%	5.1%	36.7%
Ireland	67.6%	53.7%	0.1	0.2	6.1%	1.7%	12.7%	10.1%	40.8%	3.8%	32.0%
Italy	58.7%	34.4%	0.1	0.3	6.8%	3.1%	21.3%	8.6%	64.6%	9.1%	16.1%
Latvia*	68.2%	59.1%	0.0	0.1	8.0%	1.9%	13.6%	15.4%	66.7%	8.0%	45.8%
Lithuania*	64.4%	53.0%	0.1	0.1	5.9%	1.3%	13.3%	13.4%	56.8%	6.9%	44.2%
Luxembourg	63.4%	34.1%	0.2	0.2	5.1%	1.6%	17.9%	6.6%	48.1%	8.7%	26.8%
Malta*	55.5%	30.1%	0.1	0.5	6.0%	2.5%	11.7%	8.2%	50.3%	4.1%	22.0%
Netherlands	77.2%	53.0%	0.1	0.1	2.7%	1.1%	5.3%	4.6%	35.5%	4.3%	36.5%
Poland	59.2%	31.6%	0.3	0.2	7.2%	2.4%	17.3%	12.8%	71.0%	10.7%	39.3%
Portugal	68.2%	50.8%	0.1	0.2	8.1%	4.0%	16.4%	8.3%	81.9%	7.7%	30.8%
Romania*	59.0%	43.1%	0.1	0.2	6.1%	2.4%	18.6%	8.6%	79.2%	15.0%	43.9%
Slovakia	62.3%	39.2%	0.1	0.2	9.5%	6.7%	19.0%	39.6%	74.0%	4.5%	52.2%
Slovenia*	68.6%	32.8%	0.0	0.1	4.5%	1.9%	10.4%	6.6%	44.8%	4.0%	39.3%
Spain	64.5%	45.5%	0.0	0.2	11.3%	2.0%	24.5%	15.4%	87.2%	9.7%	18.0%
Sweden	74.3%	70.1%	0.2	0.1	6.3%	0.8%	20.2%	13.2%	54.3%	5.8%	3.1%
United Kingdom	71.5%	58.0%	0.1	0.1	5.7%	1.4%	15.0%	10.4%	42.5%	5.8%	46.0%

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2009.

Source: Own representation.

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Table 8c: SJI 2008 raw data

Country	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5
Austria	8	26.2%	7	22.7%	6	8.8%	9	0.6%	60.1	79.3	80.8
Belgium	8	26.3%	8	14.7%	7	15.1%	9	0.3%	63.7	87.6	52.4
Bulgaria*		35.3%		28.3%		21.6%		18.2%	70.6	52.6	42.8
Croatia*		29.0%		29.1%		12.1%				48.3	47.6
Cyprus*		29.8%		35.7%		13.3%		3.6%	63.0	55.0	57.2
Czech Republic	8	25.3%	6	34.5%	5	10.4%	7	0.7%	62.4	67.4	71.6
Denmark	9	25.2%	7	12.0%	7	6.2%	9	0.3%	67.4	69.0	85.6
Estonia*		33.4%		29.2%		11.9%		8.9%	52.5	67.4	57.2
EU Average		29.6%		26.7%		13.4%		4.1%	61.8	63.9	63.9
Finland	9	26.2%	9	8.5%	7	10.5%	8	0.5%	57.4	64.3	85.6
France	6	26.6%	7	31.8%	6	15.3%	8	1.4%	63.6	69.3	76.0
Germany	7	30.4%	8	17.8%	6	12.9%	7	3.5%	58.8	80.1	76.0
Greece	3	34.3%	6	35.3%	5	16.2%	4	5.4%	66.8	55.6	71.6
Hungary	5	25.6%	6	38.9%	5	17.3%	5	2.6%	56.5	70.7	52.4
Ireland	7	31.3%	9	36.7%	7	18.2%	7	2.3%	64.3	57.4	76.0
Italy	5	32.2%	7	28.7%	5	21.6%	7	4.7%	62.9	63.3	76.0
Latvia*		35.4%		30.0%		15.7%		12.3%	52.7	50.1	57.2
Lithuania*		33.8%		32.3%		14.9%		7.1%	56.1	52.3	47.6
Luxembourg	9	27.4%	7	26.7%	8	10.0%	9	0.5%	63.5	91.1	76.0
Malta*		26.3%		41.3%		7.3%		0.8%	70.1	57.4	47.6
Netherlands	9	27.6%	9	8.7%	7	5.0%	8	0.4%	65.2	83.3	85.6
Poland	5	32.2%	5	29.8%	4	14.9%	4	7.0%	59.6	54.4	52.4
Portugal	4	36.8%	8	21.7%	9	13.1%	6	9.8%	58.1	50.7	52.4
Romania*		37.8%		38.6%		13.8%		12.3%	61.6	62.3	28.4
Slovakia	7	24.5%	6	30.7%	4	16.1%	6	1.4%	55.9	63.9	38.0
Slovenia*		23.2%		36.7%		8.7%		0.2%	60.5	50.7	66.8
Spain	5	31.9%	8	13.7%	7	16.6%	7	0.1%	63.3	62.3	71.6
Sweden	9	23.4%	8	3.0%	7	11.7%	9	3.1%	67.2	61.7	95.2
United Kingdom	6	32.6%	9	30.5%	8	16.1%	7	1.4%	65.3	62.3	62.0

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2009.

Source: Own representation.

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Table 8d: SJI 2008 raw data

Country	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	F7	F8
Austria	6	8	8	10.4	27.5%	2.5%	63.8%	25.4%
Belgium	9	7	7	12.4	3.0%	1.9%	89.2%	25.8%
Bulgaria*				8.2	9.4%	0.5%	15.5%	25.8%
Croatia*				5.9	12.1%	0.8%	29.3%	26.7%
Cyprus*				13.4	4.0%	0.4%	48.9%	17.9%
Czech Republic	7	7	7	14.2	7.4%	1.4%	28.7%	20.6%
Denmark	9	9	8	12.8	17.9%	2.6%	33.4%	23.6%
Estonia*				10.0	17.1%	1.1%	4.5%	25.8%
EU Average				9.7	12.5%	1.4%	46.4%	23.8%
Finland	9	9	7	10.2	29.8%	3.5%	33.9%	24.8%
France	9	6	7	7.7	10.2%	2.1%	68.2%	25.2%
Germany	7	7	8	12.0	9.0%	2.5%	66.8%	30.4%
Greece	3	2	3	11.9	8.2%	0.6%	112.9%	27.9%
Hungary	5	5	6	7.2	5.9%	1.0%	73.0%	23.5%
Ireland	7	8	5	14.7	3.6%	1.3%	44.2%	15.6%
Italy	4	4	4	9.4	6.5%	1.2%	106.1%	30.7%
Latvia*				-1.3	29.6%	0.6%	17.2%	25.7%
Lithuania*				7.0	16.7%	0.8%	15.5%	25.2%
Luxembourg	6	8	6	25.0	2.7%	1.6%	14.4%	20.6%
Malta*				7.6	0.4%	0.6%	60.9%	19.9%
Netherlands	9	9	6	12.6	3.1%	1.8%	58.5%	21.8%
Poland	4	7	6	10.1	7.0%	0.6%	47.1%	18.9%
Portugal	5	5	5	6.1	21.9%	1.2%	71.7%	26.6%
Romania*				5.7	18.3%	0.5%	13.6%	22.9%
Slovakia	5	9	4	7.7	7.3%	0.5%	27.9%	16.8%
Slovenia*				8.1	15.6%	1.5%	22.0%	23.3%
Spain	5	5	4	8.7	9.7%	1.3%	40.2%	23.8%
Sweden	10	9	8	3.3	44.1%	3.4%	38.8%	26.7%
United Kingdom	7	7	7	10.6	1.8%	1.8%	51.9%	24.0%

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2009.

Source: Own representation.

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Table 9a: SJI 2011 raw data

Country	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7	A8	A9	A10	B1	B2	B3	B4
Austria	17.0%	17.5%	16.4%	7.2%	4.8%	5.6%	2.8%	12.0%	13.4%	15.1%	7	8.0	0.5%	8.3%
Belgium	20.2%	20.5%	23.1%	12.3%	5.2%	6.5%	3.1%	14.6%	16.6%	21.6%	7	9.1	0.8%	11.9%
Bulgaria*	46.2%	47.3%	66.0%	6.9%	41.9%	43.6%	58.4%	21.8%	24.9%	39.3%		10.3	0.9%	13.9%
Croatia*								17.9%	18.7%	31.3%		3.5	0.6%	3.7%
Cyprus*	23.5%	20.2%	48.6%	4.0%	9.5%	9.3%	9.5%	15.8%	12.3%	46.4%			0.4%	12.7%
Czech Republic	14.0%	17.2%	11.7%	6.0%	6.1%	7.4%	5.7%	8.6%	13.3%	7.2%	7	5.7	0.5%	4.9%
Denmark	17.6%	14.0%	20.6%	8.8%	2.3%	2.1%	0.9%	13.1%	10.6%	20.1%	7	5.2	0.9%	11.0%
Estonia*	23.4%	24.5%	35.6%	5.6%	6.2%	7.0%	5.6%	19.7%	20.6%	33.9%		2.2	0.6%	11.0%
EU Average	23.7%	26.1%	25.6%	8.3%	9.7%	11.1%	9.7%	16.0%	19.2%	20.7%		5.8	0.5%	12.1%
Finland	16.9%	14.0%	23.1%	8.4%	2.8%	2.5%	2.2%	13.8%	12.1%	22.1%	10	2.4	0.4%	10.3%
France	18.5%	21.2%	13.4%	8.4%	5.6%	6.5%	3.2%	12.9%	16.8%	11.9%	5	8.5	0.6%	12.5%
Germany	20.0%	20.4%	16.0%	10.9%	5.4%	7.1%	2.5%	15.5%	15.0%	15.0%	7	7.9	0.5%	11.9%
Greece	27.6%	30.0%	26.8%	6.6%	11.0%	12.2%	12.1%	19.7%	23.7%	21.4%	2	4.3	0.1%	13.7%
Hungary	29.6%	37.2%	17.5%	11.3%	20.3%	25.5%	14.6%	12.4%	20.6%	4.6%	5	12.5	1.0%	10.5%
Ireland	25.7%	31.4%	17.9%	20.0%	6.1%	8.4%	2.6%	15.0%	18.8%	16.2%	7	4.9	0.0%	11.5%
Italy	24.7%	28.8%	22.8%	8.8%	7.0%	8.3%	5.7%	18.4%	24.4%	19.6%	5	3.8	0.5%	18.8%
Latvia*	37.9%	38.4%	55.5%	7.4%	22.1%	24.6%	25.3%	26.4%	26.3%	47.6%		3.0	0.9%	12.9%
Lithuania*	29.6%	30.8%	35.3%	7.2%	15.6%	15.8%	18.8%	20.3%	23.3%	23.9%		4.5	0.5%	7.9%
Luxembourg	17.8%	23.7%	6.2%	6.3%	1.1%	1.2%	0.2%	14.9%	22.3%	6.0%	3	7.2	0.5%	7.1%
Malta*	20.3%	26.5%	22.2%	9.2%	5.0%	7.2%	4.1%	14.9%	21.2%	19.7%			0.4%	23.8%
Netherlands	15.1%	17.5%	8.1%	8.5%	1.4%	1.5%	0.4%	11.1%	15.4%	7.7%	8	4.7	0.4%	10.0%
Poland	27.8%	31.0%	25.8%	6.9%	15.0%	15.3%	17.3%	17.1%	23.0%	14.4%	4	5.8	0.6%	5.4%
Portugal	24.9%	28.7%	26.0%	7.0%	9.1%	10.5%	10.6%	17.9%	22.9%	20.1%	5	5.0	0.5%	28.7%
Romania*	43.1%	52.0%	43.1%	7.7%	32.2%	40.3%	33.8%	22.4%	32.9%	21.0%		4.9	0.8%	18.4%
Slovakia	19.6%	23.7%	19.7%	5.6%	11.1%	12.7%	11.7%	11.0%	16.8%	10.8%	4	6.0	0.5%	4.7%
Slovenia*	17.1%	15.1%	23.3%	5.6%	6.1%	5.4%	6.5%	11.3%	11.2%	20.0%		5.6	0.5%	5.0%
Spain	24.5%	30.0%	24.3%	7.6%	4.5%	6.7%	2.3%	20.1%	26.8%	23.1%	5	3.9	0.6%	28.2%
Sweden	15.9%	15.1%	18.0%	6.4%	1.6%	1.7%	0.5%	13.3%	13.1%	17.7%	7	5.8	0.7%	6.5%
United Kingdom	22.0%	27.4%	23.1%	12.7%	3.3%	4.4%	1.2%	17.3%	20.7%	22.3%	6	6.0	0.3%	14.9%

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2011.

Source: Own representation.

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Table 9b: SJI 2011 raw data

Country	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9	C10	C11
Austria	71.7%	42.4%	0.1	0.1	4.5%	1.1%	8.8%	8.7%	8.6%	4.7%	35.2%
Belgium	62.0%	37.3%	0.2	0.2	8.4%	4.1%	22.4%	15.4%	74.5%	3.8%	13.0%
Bulgaria*	59.7%	43.5%	0.2	0.1	10.3%	4.8%	23.2%	23.1%	73.3%	6.2%	40.7%
Croatia*	54.0%	37.6%	0.0	0.2	12.1%	6.7%	32.6%	13.2%	48.3%		35.5%
Cyprus*	68.9%	56.3%	0.1	0.2	6.5%	1.3%	16.6%	7.6%	93.9%	6.0%	33.9%
Czech Republic	65.0%	46.5%	0.0	0.2	7.4%	3.0%	18.3%	25.3%	75.2%	2.9%	40.9%
Denmark	73.3%	58.4%	0.1	0.1	7.6%	1.5%	14.0%	11.3%	47.6%	5.2%	14.8%
Estonia*	61.2%	53.8%	0.0	0.0	17.1%	7.6%	32.9%	31.9%	43.1%	6.9%	44.1%
EU Average	63.3%	45.9%	0.1	0.2	10.2%	4.2%	23.2%	18.1%	62.1%	6.6%	32.4%
Finland	68.1%	56.2%	0.1	0.0	8.5%	2.0%	21.4%	16.7%	65.1%	2.9%	11.5%
France	63.9%	39.8%	0.1	0.1	9.3%	3.7%	22.9%	15.4%	57.4%	5.3%	11.9%
Germany	71.1%	57.7%	0.1	0.1	7.2%	3.4%	9.9%	15.1%	24.0%	5.1%	54.6%
Greece	59.6%	42.3%	0.1	0.3	12.7%	5.7%	32.9%	12.9%	84.9%	12.5%	18.3%
Hungary	55.4%	34.4%	0.2	0.2	11.2%	5.5%	26.6%	25.3%	69.0%	5.2%	40.8%
Ireland	59.6%	50.2%	0.0	0.1	14.1%	6.8%	27.6%	22.2%	62.8%	4.2%	30.9%
Italy	56.9%	36.6%	0.1	0.3	8.5%	4.1%	27.8%	10.5%	67.8%	9.0%	20.9%
Latvia*	58.5%	47.8%	0.0	0.0	19.8%	8.8%	36.2%	33.7%	72.3%	9.3%	42.6%
Lithuania*	57.6%	48.3%	0.1	0.0	18.1%	7.4%	35.7%	41.3%	71.5%	8.9%	44.1%
Luxembourg	65.2%	39.6%	0.2	0.2	4.4%	1.3%	14.2%	6.1%	41.4%	9.0%	33.7%
Malta*	56.2%	31.9%	0.1	0.5	6.9%	3.1%	13.2%	9.7%	53.1%	5.0%	29.5%
Netherlands	74.7%	53.7%	0.2	0.1	4.5%	1.2%	8.7%	7.4%	31.9%	4.0%	37.1%
Poland	58.9%	34.1%	0.1	0.2	9.7%	3.0%	23.7%	18.3%	74.1%	10.0%	44.9%
Portugal	65.6%	49.2%	0.1	0.1	11.4%	6.3%	22.4%	12.5%	84.2%	8.5%	25.3%
Romania*	58.8%	41.1%	0.3	0.2	7.6%	2.5%	22.1%	7.2%	78.7%	13.8%	49.4%
Slovakia	58.8%	40.5%	0.0	0.2	14.4%	9.3%	33.6%	44.3%	76.1%	4.8%	51.5%
Slovenia*	66.2%	35.0%	0.0	0.1	7.4%	3.2%	14.7%	12.5%	51.8%	4.3%	40.0%
Spain	58.8%	43.5%	0.0	0.2	20.0%	7.3%	41.5%	27.3%	91.3%	10.3%	22.4%
Sweden	72.1%	70.4%	0.2	0.1	8.8%	1.6%	24.8%	17.6%	59.1%	6.2%	4.2%
United Kingdom	69.5%	57.1%	0.1	0.1	7.9%	2.5%	19.6%	14.2%	57.2%	4.9%	34.6%

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2011.

Source: Own representation.

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Table 9c: SJI 2011 raw data

Country	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5
Austria	8	25.7%	6	22.1%	4	9.2%	8	0.5%	60.2	78.9	76.0
Belgium	8	26.4%	8	10.7%	6	16.2%	9	0.6%	63.8	92.1	62.0
Bulgaria*		33.4%		29.2%		28.1%		10.3%	64.0	49.0	38.0
Croatia*		27.0%		26.5%		18.8%				61.0	57.2
Cyprus*		29.5%		37.5%		16.2%		3.4%	65.3	73.3	62.0
Czech Republic	7	25.1%	6	28.0%	5	13.3%	7	0.6%	61.9	73.6	76.0
Denmark	9	26.9%	7	12.0%	7	8.5%	9	1.5%	61.1	70.3	80.8
Estonia*		31.4%		27.2%		20.8%		4.3%	57.2	63.3	57.2
EU Average		29.5%		26.4%		17.1%		3.1%	61.7	67.1	67.0
Finland	8	25.9%	9	10.0%	7	13.3%	8	3.7%	58.4	63.6	90.4
France	6	29.9%	6	31.1%	6	18.3%	7	1.9%	63.2	81.3	80.8
Germany	7	29.1%	8	17.2%	6	12.4%	7	2.1%	57.6	80.1	85.6
Greece	4	33.1%	6	32.7%	5	21.7%	5	5.5%	66.5	63.1	76.0
Hungary	5	24.7%	6	40.9%	5	19.5%	4	2.1%	57.1	65.4	47.6
Ireland	8	28.8%	9	36.1%	7	26.1%	6	2.0%	64.6	81.3	80.8
Italy	5	31.5%	7	28.7%	4	25.9%	7	5.3%	63.0	61.0	85.6
Latvia*		37.5%		30.0%		25.9%		9.6%	54.6	56.3	52.4
Lithuania*		35.9%		30.9%		22.2%		3.1%	59.4	53.7	52.4
Luxembourg	9	29.2%	8	30.0%	9	7.2%	8	0.6%	65.5	88.6	80.8
Malta*		27.4%		41.3%		10.0%		1.3%	70.2	63.3	52.4
Netherlands	8	27.2%	9	9.3%	8	6.4%	7	0.3%	60.9	79.8	90.4
Poland	5	31.4%	7	30.0%	4	17.2%	5	7.6%	60.5	55.4	52.4
Portugal	4	35.4%	7	22.6%	8	15.8%	7	3.3%	57.3	55.7	52.4
Romania*		34.9%		38.6%		21.1%		8.5%	60.8	53.7	42.8
Slovakia	5	24.8%	4	34.7%	4	21.7%	5	1.7%	52.5	61.9	38.0
Slovenia*		22.7%		35.6%		9.8%		0.2%	61.1	65.7	62.0
Spain	5	33.0%	8	13.4%	6	23.2%	7	0.4%	62.5	58.9	71.6
Sweden	9	24.8%	9	5.0%	7	11.5%	9	2.0%	70.1	68.6	100.0
United Kingdom	7	32.4%	8	28.0%	8	18.4%	7	1.2%	65.6	60.3	71.6

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2011.

Source: Own representation.

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Table 9d: SJI 2011 raw data

Country	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	F7	F8
Austria	6	6	6	9.1	30.4%	2.7%	72.3%	26.1%
Belgium	9	6	6	11.3	4.6%	2.0%	95.7%	26.0%
Bulgaria*				6.6	12.4%	0.5%	14.9%	26.5%
Croatia*				5.1	13.1%	0.9%	42.6%	26.7%
Cyprus*				12.4	5.6%	0.5%	61.3%	17.8%
Czech Republic	6	7	7	12.2	8.5%	1.4%	37.9%	21.7%
Denmark	9	9	8	11.6	20.4%	3.2%	42.8%	24.9%
Estonia*				7.6	23.0%	1.4%	6.7%	25.9%
EU Average				8.3	14.7%	1.6%	60.5%	24.4%
Finland	9	9	8	5.1	31.2%	3.9%	48.7%	25.6%
France	10	5	6	7.3	12.2%	2.3%	82.4%	25.6%
Germany	7	7	8	11.1	9.9%	2.8%	82.5%	31.4%
Greece	4	2	3	10.8	8.5%	0.6%	148.3%	28.4%
Hungary	5	7	7	6.3	8.0%	1.2%	82.1%	24.2%
Ireland	7	6	6	12.7	5.2%	1.7%	91.2%	16.5%
Italy	4	5	5	7.8	9.3%	1.3%	119.3%	31.2%
Latvia*				-1.7	34.3%	0.5%	39.7%	26.8%
Lithuania*				3.1	20.0%	0.8%	38.3%	25.6%
Luxembourg	9	8	7	22.4	2.9%	1.7%	19.5%	20.4%
Malta*				7.2	0.4%	0.5%	66.0%	21.4%
Netherlands	8	8	5	12.1	4.1%	1.8%	63.4%	22.8%
Poland	6	7	6	9.4	8.8%	0.7%	54.8%	19.0%
Portugal	5	4	6	5.5	24.5%	1.6%	94.0%	27.5%
Romania*				4.7	22.6%	0.5%	31.1%	23.4%
Slovakia	5	7	4	7.1	9.3%	0.5%	41.0%	17.3%
Slovenia*				7.3	18.9%	1.9%	38.7%	23.8%
Spain	5	5	5	7.0	13.0%	1.4%	61.7%	24.6%
Sweden	10	9	8	2.5	48.2%	3.6%	39.4%	27.7%
United Kingdom	8	8	7	9.3	3.0%	1.8%	78.5%	24.6%

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2011.

Source: Own representation.

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Table 10a: SJI 2014 raw data

Country	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7	A8	A9	A10	B1	B2	B3	B4
Austria	18.8%	22.0%	16.2%	7.8%	4.2%	6.4%	1.8%	14.4%	18.6%	15.4%	5	6.4	0.6%	7.3%
Belgium	21.6%	23.1%	19.6%	14.1%	6.5%	8.6%	2.9%	15.0%	16.7%	17.8%	6	6.3	0.8%	11.0%
Bulgaria	49.3%	52.3%	59.1%	12.5%	45.9%	51.0%	53.0%	21.2%	28.2%	28.2%	4	11.5	0.9%	12.5%
Croatia	32.3%	33.8%	33.2%	16.2%	15.4%	17.6%	15.0%	20.5%	22.3%	26.5%	6	3.8	0.7%	3.7%
Cyprus	27.1%	27.5%	33.4%	6.5%	16.1%	18.7%	9.0%	14.7%	13.9%	29.3%	7	2.8	0.4%	9.1%
Czech Republic	14.6%	16.4%	10.4%	6.9%	6.6%	7.3%	5.3%	8.6%	11.3%	5.8%	6	6.8	0.7%	5.4%
Denmark	19.0%	15.3%	14.6%	11.3%	2.8%	3.6%	0.6%	13.1%	10.2%	14.1%	6	6.0	1.6%	8.0%
Estonia	23.5%	22.3%	28.0%	8.4%	7.6%	7.0%	6.3%	18.6%	18.1%	24.4%	9	1.8	0.4%	9.7%
EU Average	25.4%	28.0%	21.7%	10.4%	11.5%	13.5%	9.5%	16.2%	19.7%	15.5%	5.7	5.6	0.6%	10.4%
Finland	16.0%	13.0%	16.8%	9.0%	2.5%	1.8%	1.1%	11.8%	9.3%	16.1%	9	2.5	0.4%	9.3%
France	19.1%	23.2%	11.1%	8.4%	5.0%	5.9%	2.7%	14.1%	19.0%	9.4%	6	10.9	0.7%	9.7%
Germany	19.6%	18.4%	15.8%	9.9%	4.9%	4.8%	2.8%	16.1%	15.2%	15.0%	6	5.6	0.6%	9.9%
Greece	34.6%	35.4%	23.5%	14.2%	19.5%	20.9%	14.3%	23.1%	26.9%	17.2%	3	4.1	0.1%	10.1%
Hungary	33.5%	43.0%	19.0%	12.6%	26.8%	35.0%	16.7%	14.3%	23.2%	4.4%	4	8.5	0.9%	11.8%
Ireland	30.0%	33.1%	14.7%	23.4%	9.8%	12.4%	2.9%	15.7%	18.0%	12.2%	6	5.9	0.1%	8.4%
Italy	28.4%	31.9%	22.6%	11.0%	12.4%	13.7%	10.7%	19.1%	24.8%	15.3%	4	3.0	0.4%	17.0%
Latvia	35.1%	38.4%	36.1%	10.0%	24.0%	25.4%	26.6%	19.4%	23.4%	17.6%	5	5.0	0.8%	9.8%
Lithuania	32.5%	31.9%	35.7%	11.4%	16.0%	18.5%	18.4%	18.6%	20.8%	18.7%	7	3.6	0.7%	6.3%
Luxembourg	18.4%	24.6%	6.1%	6.1%	1.3%	1.7%	0.0%	15.1%	22.6%	6.1%	4	5.8	0.8%	6.1%
Malta	23.1%	31.0%	22.3%	9.0%	9.5%	11.8%	7.1%	15.1%	23.1%	17.3%	5	5.6	0.4%	20.8%
Netherlands	15.0%	16.9%	6.2%	8.9%	2.3%	3.3%	0.7%	10.1%	13.2%	5.5%	6	4.2	0.4%	9.2%
Poland	25.8%	29.8%	19.7%	7.2%	11.9%	11.8%	11.5%	17.3%	23.2%	12.3%	6	4.8	0.5%	5.6%
Portugal	25.3%	27.8%	22.2%	10.1%	10.9%	13.9%	9.0%	17.9%	21.8%	17.4%	4	5.2	0.5%	19.2%
Romania	41.7%	52.2%	35.7%	7.4%	28.7%	34.4%	27.6%	22.6%	34.6%	15.4%	4	6.3	0.7%	17.3%
Slovakia	19.8%	25.5%	13.6%	7.6%	10.2%	13.0%	9.2%	12.8%	20.3%	6.0%	4	13.4	0.5%	6.4%
Slovenia	19.6%	16.4%	22.8%	7.5%	6.6%	5.9%	6.6%	13.5%	13.5%	19.6%	7	5.6	0.7%	3.9%
Spain	27.3%	32.6%	14.5%	15.7%	6.2%	8.3%	2.7%	20.4%	27.5%	12.7%	5	3.9	0.7%	23.6%
Sweden	15.6%	15.4%	17.9%	5.7%	1.3%	1.4%	0.4%	14.1%	14.6%	17.7%	8	3.4	0.7%	7.1%
United Kingdom	24.1%	31.2%	16.9%	13.0%	7.8%	12.5%	1.4%	16.2%	18.5%	16.1%	7	4.8	0.3%	12.4%

Source: Own representation.

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Table 10b: SJI 2014 raw data

Country	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9	C10	C11
Austria	72.3%	44.9%	0.1	0.1	5.0%	1.2%	9.2%	9.8%	8.1%	6.8%	35.2%
Belgium	61.8%	41.7%	0.2	0.1	8.5%	3.9%	23.7%	16.0%	78.0%	3.6%	13.0%
Bulgaria	59.5%	47.4%	0.0	0.1	13.0%	7.4%	28.4%	30.3%	70.9%	6.6%	40.7%
Croatia	49.2%	36.5%	0.1	0.1	17.6%	11.0%	49.7%	21.9%	50.4%	5.7%	35.5%
Cyprus	61.7%	49.6%	0.1	0.2	16.1%	6.1%	38.9%	20.2%	95.2%	6.9%	33.9%
Czech Republic	67.7%	51.6%	0.0	0.2	7.0%	3.0%	19.0%	26.0%	82.4%	3.5%	40.9%
Denmark	72.5%	61.7%	0.1	0.1	7.2%	1.8%	13.1%	11.4%	50.6%	4.6%	14.8%
Estonia	68.5%	62.6%	0.0	0.1	8.9%	3.8%	18.7%	15.7%	34.8%	7.1%	44.1%
EU Average	63.5%	48.6%	0.1	0.1	11.3%	5.4%	26.2%	20.0%	63.9%	6.7%	32.4%
Finland	68.9%	58.5%	0.1	0.0	8.3%	1.7%	19.9%	17.8%	66.8%	2.7%	11.5%
France	64.1%	45.6%	0.1	0.1	9.9%	4.1%	23.9%	16.4%	60.2%	6.6%	11.9%
Germany	73.3%	63.5%	0.1	0.1	5.4%	2.4%	7.9%	12.2%	21.2%	5.7%	54.6%
Greece	49.3%	35.6%	0.0	0.3	27.5%	18.6%	58.3%	30.1%	87.7%	13.4%	18.3%
Hungary	58.4%	38.5%	0.2	0.2	10.3%	5.0%	27.2%	24.2%	73.1%	5.4%	40.8%
Ireland	60.5%	51.3%	0.0	0.1	13.3%	7.9%	26.8%	22.2%	65.3%	3.3%	30.9%
Italy	55.6%	42.7%	0.0	0.3	12.4%	6.9%	40.0%	16.2%	73.3%	9.0%	20.9%
Latvia	65.0%	54.8%	0.1	0.1	12.1%	5.8%	23.2%	25.7%	69.1%	7.7%	42.6%
Lithuania	63.7%	53.4%	0.1	0.0	12.0%	5.1%	21.9%	33.9%	64.5%	5.8%	44.1%
Luxembourg	65.7%	40.5%	0.2	0.2	5.9%	1.8%	15.5%	10.3%	53.1%	9.0%	33.7%
Malta	60.8%	36.2%	0.0	0.4	6.5%	2.9%	13.0%	10.0%	51.7%	4.4%	29.5%
Netherlands	74.3%	60.1%	0.2	0.1	6.7%	2.4%	11.0%	10.5%	40.6%	4.1%	37.1%
Poland	60.0%	40.6%	0.0	0.2	10.5%	4.4%	27.3%	21.3%	66.8%	9.7%	44.9%
Portugal	61.1%	46.7%	0.0	0.1	17.0%	9.3%	37.7%	18.4%	86.2%	8.5%	25.3%
Romania	59.7%	41.5%	0.0	0.2	7.6%	3.4%	23.6%	8.0%	88.5%	15.9%	49.4%
Slovakia	59.9%	44.0%	0.1	0.2	14.3%	10.0%	33.7%	42.6%	86.9%	5.8%	51.5%
Slovenia	63.3%	33.5%	0.0	0.1	10.3%	5.2%	21.6%	18.8%	55.9%	5.6%	40.0%
Spain	54.8%	43.2%	0.1	0.2	26.2%	13.0%	55.5%	35.5%	91.7%	8.9%	22.4%
Sweden	74.4%	73.6%	0.2	0.0	8.2%	1.5%	23.5%	19.5%	58.6%	5.1%	4.2%
United Kingdom	70.8%	59.8%	0.0	0.1	7.7%	2.7%	20.5%	14.4%	57.2%	6.5%	34.6%

Source: Own representation.

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Table 10c: SJI 2014 raw data

Country	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5
Austria	7	27.0%	6	16.7%	5	9.1%	8	0.3%	61.4	82.1	66.8
Belgium	7	26.6%	7	12.0%	6	18.0%	8	1.7%	64.9	93.7	71.6
Bulgaria	4	33.6%	6	25.4%	4	26.3%	4	8.2%	63.9	55.6	38.0
Croatia	4	30.5%	5	26.2%	3	25.2%	5	3.6%	63.3	68.3	62.0
Cyprus	7	31.0%	8	39.3%	4	28.4%	7	3.5%	63.7	55.7	62.0
Czech Republic	6	24.6%	6	30.5%	5	13.7%	8	1.0%	63.2	74.2	71.6
Denmark	8	28.1%	8	10.9%	7	8.7%	8	1.2%	61.0	82.2	85.6
Estonia	6	32.5%	7	29.2%	7	16.2%	8	8.3%	55.3	63.1	62.0
EU Average	6.2	29.6%	6.9	23.7%	5.8	18.0%	6.4	3.6%	61.9	66.9	65.7
Finland	8	25.4%	8	7.5%	8	13.1%	8	4.6%	56.7	69.4	90.4
France	7	30.5%	6	23.1%	6	15.9%	7	2.2%	63.3	79.4	76.0
Germany	7	28.3%	8	13.5%	8	9.5%	8	1.6%	57.7	77.8	80.8
Greece	3	34.3%	4	29.0%	5	31.6%	3	8.0%	64.9	53.7	62.0
Hungary	5	28.0%	5	41.2%	5	22.6%	4	2.8%	59.9	55.7	42.8
Ireland	7	29.9%	9	34.3%	7	22.1%	5	2.2%	67.3	68.3	71.6
Italy	4	32.5%	7	18.6%	5	32.0%	7	5.6%	61.8	55.7	71.6
Latvia	5	35.2%	7	27.0%	5	18.3%	4	12.3%	57.0	45.2	42.8
Lithuania	6	32.0%	7	25.9%	7	18.0%	8	2.3%	59.3	60.3	57.2
Luxembourg	9	28.0%	8	26.7%	8	7.4%	8	0.7%	66.1	88.1	76.0
Malta	6	27.1%	5	35.7%	3	9.7%	7	1.1%	72.1	67.4	47.6
Netherlands	8	25.4%	9	11.3%	8	7.8%	7	0.5%	61.2	91.8	90.4
Poland	7	30.7%	8	26.3%	5	19.4%	5	9.0%	61.1	50.8	47.6
Portugal	5	34.5%	8	21.3%	7	20.5%	6	3.3%	59.6	58.4	66.8
Romania	4	33.2%	5	36.7%	6	22.6%	4	10.7%	57.8	48.8	33.2
Slovakia	5	25.3%	5	31.3%	5	20.4%	5	2.2%	53.2	63.9	57.2
Slovenia	7	23.7%	7	17.8%	4	13.7%	6	0.1%	56.0	57.1	76.0
Spain	5	33.7%	7	14.0%	6	26.3%	6	0.7%	65.2	66.8	71.6
Sweden	9	24.8%	9	5.3%	7	10.3%	8	1.3%	70.8	68.2	90.4
United Kingdom	7	32.8%	8	27.5%	7	18.5%	8	1.4%	64.5	71.4	66.8

Source: Own representation.

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Table 10d: SJI 2014 raw data

Country	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	F7	F8
Austria	7	6	6	9.0	32.1%	2.8%	74.2%	26.8%
Belgium	8	6	6	10.3	6.8%	2.2%	99.8%	26.8%
Bulgaria	6	6	6	7.3	16.3%	0.6%	17.6%	28.5%
Croatia	5	4	5	4.8	16.8%	0.8%	59.8%	27.1%
Cyprus	4	4	4	10.7	6.8%	0.5%	112.0%	18.8%
Czech Republic	6	8	7	11.8	11.2%	1.9%	47.9%	24.6%
Denmark	9	9	8	9.1	26.0%	3.0%	45.2%	27.6%
Estonia	9	7	9	13.1	25.8%	2.2%	11.3%	27.2%
EU Average	6.8	6.1	6.2	8.2	16.8%	1.7%	72.3%	26.0%
Finland	9	9	7	6.5	34.3%	3.6%	57.0%	28.9%
France	10	5	6	6.8	13.4%	2.3%	93.9%	27.5%
Germany	7	7	8	11.4	12.4%	3.0%	78.1%	31.3%
Greece	4	4	4	9.8	13.8%	0.7%	173.8%	30.9%
Hungary	4	4	6	5.8	9.6%	1.3%	79.2%	25.1%
Ireland	7	6	7	12.1	7.2%	1.7%	122.8%	18.6%
Italy	4	5	4	7.4	13.5%	1.3%	132.5%	32.7%
Latvia	7	5	9	-0.7	35.8%	0.7%	32.1%	28.1%
Lithuania	8	7	8	4.6	21.7%	0.9%	39.3%	27.2%
Luxembourg	9	7	6	21.2	3.1%	1.5%	22.9%	20.2%
Malta	5	5	4	7.4	1.4%	0.8%	71.7%	25.1%
Netherlands	9	8	5	11.6	4.5%	2.2%	74.9%	25.5%
Poland	7	7	6	9.5	11.0%	0.9%	57.5%	20.1%
Portugal	6	4	5	5.3	24.6%	1.5%	128.8%	29.4%
Romania	5	4	5	4.9	22.9%	0.5%	39.3%	23.9%
Slovakia	5	5	5	6.4	10.4%	0.8%	54.9%	18.4%
Slovenia	8	7	7	7.1	20.2%	2.8%	73.0%	25.0%
Spain	5	6	4	6.6	14.3%	1.3%	93.9%	26.3%
Sweden	10	8	8	2.3	51.0%	3.4%	41.4%	29.9%
United Kingdom	8	8	8	9.0	4.2%	1.7%	90.1%	26.4%

Source: Own representation.

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Imprint

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Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256
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page 1: picsfive / fotolia

Printing

Matthiesen Druck, Bielefeld



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